Dead in the Water: Nada Gordon’s Synthetic Critics and the End of Literary Judgment

By Malcolm R. Sedgewick

When I first encountered Nada Gordon’s gallery of imaginary literary critics, I was less offended than perplexed. Gordon is a serious poet, or at least a poet who has spent several decades engaged in a sustained and sometimes interesting experiment with the possibilities of language. She has written books, participated in literary communities, and developed an aesthetic sufficiently distinctive to attract both admirers and detractors. Why, then, would she want to manufacture a collection of people who have never existed in order to have them write about her work? What satisfaction could possibly be derived from commissioning fictitious judgments of one’s own poetry, particularly when those judgments are produced by a machine that has no investment in their accuracy, significance, or consequences?

The enterprise currently comprises four critics. Mira K. Vell is an enthusiast for the grotesque and ornamental, whose fictional scholarly career has been devoted to the aesthetic vindication of excess. Adrian V. Thorne is a severe intellectual who finds Gordon’s poetry a particularly ingenious form of bad faith. River Solstice Vale, a San Francisco-based genderfluid ecopoet, objects to the ethics of Gordon’s appropriations and her supposed indifference to ecological and gender justice. Eleanor Whitcomb Hale, a former Iowa Poet Laureate with an implausibly extensive collection of literary honors, believes that Gordon’s work substitutes verbal ingenuity for the emotional honesty that poetry ought to provide.

Each critic has an elaborate professional biography, complete with imaginary publications and distinctions, and each has been furnished with a computer-generated photographic portrait. The essays have been published on Gordon’s blog, Otohime, with editorial notes acknowledging their fictional origins.

The acknowledgment is important, though it does considerably less work than Gordon may imagine. We are not being deceived into believing that these people exist. We are being invited to enjoy their simulated existence, to appreciate how efficiently a machine can reproduce the recognizable intellectual and social characteristics of various literary types. The results are superficially impressive. The critics have different vocabularies, different objects of resentment, and different ideas about what constitutes an artistic achievement. They sound, at first, rather like people one might actually encounter at a poetry reading, a faculty meeting, or a particularly unpleasant conference panel.

Yet after reading all four essays, I began to notice that their differences were largely matters of costume. Beneath the costumes, the same verbal machinery was operating with dispiriting regularity.

Consider Mira K. Vell, the most sympathetic of Gordon’s inventions. Vell admires the poet’s extravagance and proposes to understand it through a familiar academic vocabulary of ornament, embodiment, nonsense, and excess. She writes that the peculiar beauty of Gordon’s work arises where “the language of the world, in all its vulgarity and magnificence, becomes something at once recognizably inherited and unexpectedly strange.”

This is an agreeable formulation, and in another context it might serve as the beginning of a useful argument. But what has actually been established? The language is vulgar and magnificent, inherited and strange, familiar and transformed. These terms are sufficiently elastic to accommodate almost any experimental poem whose author has made extensive use of found materials. Vell’s critical intelligence consists largely in discovering flattering descriptions for procedures whose value she has already decided to affirm. She offers an elegant vocabulary of appreciation, but one looks in vain for a moment in which her aesthetic commitments are seriously tested by the work under consideration.

I am aware that a critic’s sympathy with an author does not invalidate her judgment. Some of the most penetrating criticism has emerged from an intimate understanding of the writer’s ambitions. But sympathy becomes intellectually uninteresting when it functions as a guarantee that whatever the poet does will be interpreted as an achievement. Vell’s essay proceeds with a confidence that is suspiciously independent of its evidence. She has been designed to admire Gordon, and admire her she does. The machine has learned how a certain kind of academic admiration sounds, and it produces that sound with remarkable consistency.

Adrian V. Thorne has ostensibly been constructed to provide the opposite judgment. His essay, “The Alibi of Excess,” is considerably more severe, and I confess that portions of it are better than I expected. Thorne argues that Gordon’s poetry possesses an extraordinary ability to convert its potential deficiencies into evidence of aesthetic accomplishment. His opening paragraph contains the observation that “prolixity becomes abundance; arbitrary association becomes linguistic freedom; compositional negligence becomes an openness to accident.” He subsequently claims that Gordon’s self-consciousness functions as an elaborate mechanism of exoneration: by acknowledging the questionable nature of her procedures, she seeks to relieve herself of the obligation to defend them.

There is a genuine critical question here. I have wondered myself whether certain strains of experimental poetry have developed an almost inexhaustible capacity to assimilate objections into their own self-descriptions. Thorne’s account of a writer who anticipates criticism so thoroughly that criticism becomes another form of artistic material deserves consideration. It would be foolish to dismiss the observation simply because it has been produced by a language model.

Nevertheless, the essay’s apparent sophistication conceals the same structural difficulty as Vell’s enthusiasm. Thorne knows his conclusion before he begins. Every instance of verbal invention becomes evidence of evasion, every admission of vanity becomes a further expression of vanity, and every moment of pleasure is interpreted as a distraction from the absence of necessity. The argument is elegantly sealed against contradiction. Gordon cannot escape the charge of bad faith because anything she might say in her defense can itself be characterized as another manifestation of bad faith.

One notices, moreover, a peculiar resemblance between the two critics’ rhetorical habits. Both move with extraordinary fluency from an observation about a specific phrase to a comprehensive account of the poet’s aesthetic. Both employ distinctions that appear rigorous while remaining conveniently resistant to verification. Both repeatedly convert the same limited repertoire of compositional characteristics into sweeping judgments about authorial intention.

The approving critic discovers abundance wherever she looks. The disapproving critic discovers evasion. Neither seems capable of being surprised.

River Solstice Vale provides an especially instructive example of the technology’s dependence upon recognizable ideological conventions. Their essay, “The Aesthetics of Extraction,” begins by declaring Gordon’s poetry “a particularly insidious strain of late-capitalist experimental writing” and proceeds to characterize her practice as “poetry as resource extraction. This is poetry as shopping. This is poetry as a kind of gleeful, compulsive hoarding.”

The terms have been selected with admirable efficiency. Extraction, consumption, capitalism, hoarding: we know immediately where we are, what kind of person is speaking, and what moral verdict will follow. Vale’s literary judgment is inseparable from a prefabricated vocabulary of political disapproval. The critic has scarcely begun to examine Gordon’s poems before the available charges have arranged themselves into a prosecutorial sequence.

At one point, discussing a reference to a Central Asian sheep in Gordon’s “Poem to My Enemies,” Vale asks, “What would happen if the sheep were allowed to remain a sheep?”

I stared at this sentence for some time.

The question has the cadence of an ethical revelation. Its very simplicity seems designed to embarrass anyone sufficiently frivolous to have found the animal’s name or associations interesting. But it is difficult to determine what would constitute a satisfactory answer. The sheep is, after all, already a sheep. Its appearance in a poem does not alter its biological existence, and the fact that a poet uses an animal as a linguistic or imaginative resource does not in itself establish an act of material exploitation. Vale’s argument depends upon treating representation as a form of possession, an assumption that would make a considerable portion of world literature morally suspect.

The manufactured critic then contrasts Gordon with Brenda Iijima, Juliana Spahr, and Cody-Rose Clevidence, all of whom are said to understand the ethical obligations that Gordon neglects. I have no quarrel with these poets, whose work deserves attention on its own terms. What interests me is the extraordinary neatness with which they are conscripted into the argument. Each is made to exemplify a virtue whose absence has already been discovered in Gordon. Their works become illustrations of correct political consciousness, and the critical task is reduced to identifying which poet has demonstrated the approved relationship to the world.

Vale’s biography is almost as revealing as the essay. We are told that their practice operates “at the intersection of trans ecological justice, abolitionist poetics, anti-extractive aesthetics, disability solidarity, decolonial land relations, and radically embodied multispecies care.” The accumulation is clearly intended as satire, but it illustrates a rather dismal conception of contemporary political writing: a collection of interchangeable phrases, each signaling moral commitment without requiring any particular intellectual substance. The joke depends upon our recognizing the language as ridiculous before we have considered what any of its terms might actually mean.

I am not defending the rhetorical habits of contemporary activist poetry, which can be every bit as formulaic as those of any other literary movement. I am suggesting that parody ought to do more than reproduce its subject’s most readily identifiable verbal characteristics. Vale is a bundle of prejudices supplied with an ideological vocabulary. No comparable effort has been made to imagine the intellectual experiences through which those prejudices might have developed.

The fourth critic, Eleanor Whitcomb Hale, is perhaps the most depressing creation of all. Hale is an extravagantly celebrated American poet who believes, with a confidence apparently undisturbed by fifty years of literary argument, that poetry exists to communicate authentic human feeling. Her essay opens with a declaration that the poem must begin in courage, specifically “the courage to tell the truth.” She worries that Gordon’s facility with language has become an obstacle to emotional honesty, and she repeatedly urges the poet to abandon her elaborate verbal performances in favor of sincerity, vulnerability, and the ordinary dignity of human experience.

Hale’s conception of authenticity is so mechanically conventional that one begins to suspect deliberate cruelty on the part of her creator. She asks Gordon to remain with her tears, to describe a loss without decorating it, and to discover that the deepest achievement of poetry is to remind us that we are not alone. Eventually she arrives at the inevitable conclusion that somewhere beneath Gordon’s verbal extravagance there exists “a quieter poet. A braver poet.”

I would be interested to know how many thousands of workshop comments have contained some variation on this sentiment. The idea that the poet’s true self lies beneath the artifices of her style has become one of the more durable pieties of American literary culture. That it can now be reproduced almost instantaneously by a machine ought to give its habitual practitioners pause.

Hale’s discussion of Gordon’s “Grandmother’s Hands” is especially revealing. Confronted with a poem that transforms the grandmother’s hands into various fantastic and grotesque entities, she asks what the grandmother actually did with those hands. Did she knead bread? Did she braid a child’s hair? Did she hold the poet when she was frightened?

The questions are so perfectly representative of a certain pedagogical sentimentalism that one can almost hear the sympathetic murmur of the workshop. The grandmother must be retrieved from the poet’s imaginative transformations and restored to the familiar activities that establish her value as an object of familial affection. The hands must resume their proper duties in the kitchen and nursery. Anything else is treated as an evasion of grief.

I find Hale’s argument intellectually impoverished, but the essay’s poverty does not interest me nearly as much as the manner of its production. Gordon has asked a machine to manufacture a critic who misunderstands her work in a particularly gratifying way. The critic obliges. Her misunderstanding has been specified in advance, elaborated into a plausible essay, and decorated with a biography that makes her a former Poet Laureate of Iowa, a MacArthur Fellow, a National Book Award winner, and the recipient of enough additional honors to render ordinary professional achievement almost embarrassing.

She is then given a photographic portrait.

This is where the project acquires its most disturbing character.

Hale’s photograph depicts a benevolent older woman looking directly into the camera, her cheek resting in her hand, her expression communicating an almost oppressive solicitude. She appears to be listening with patient concern to a confession whose emotional significance she has already understood. The pose is familiar from the author photographs of countless books about healing, resilience, memory, and the redemptive power of storytelling.

Gordon apparently devoted considerable attention to the image, adjusting the fictional woman’s appearance until she achieved the desired combination of ordinariness and excessive compassion.

I find this deeply hideous. The technological accomplishment is substantial, but the achievement itself is an impoverishment. A human face has become a collection of legible psychological attributes that can be requested, adjusted, and discarded according to the user’s satisfaction. The wrinkles, expression, clothing, and arrangement of the hand suggest the presence of a life whose experiences have produced these visible effects. There is no such life. The woman has never listened to anyone, written a poem, taught a class, experienced grief, or received an award. Her compassion is a visual convention detached from the experience of compassion.

I understand that theatrical impersonation, portraiture, caricature, and literary invention have always involved the fabrication of character. I am not proposing that the creation of imaginary people constitutes some unprecedented moral crime. What seems new, and particularly dispiriting, is the indifference to the labor of invention itself. The imaginary person can now be generated through a succession of requests, each correcting an insufficiently convincing detail. The process begins to resemble the selection of upholstery. A little less attractive, please. More earnest. Less tired. Move the hand. Adjust the expression. Make the subject look more sympathetic.

At what point does the pleasure of creation become indistinguishable from the pleasure of ordering something?

There is a further irony in Gordon’s choice of subject. Her own poetry has frequently drawn upon the unpredictable peculiarities of actual language circulating in the world. Whatever one thinks of Flarf and its related practices, the poet’s encounter with found material offered at least the possibility of resistance. The language had an existence prior to the poem, having been produced by people whose motives, circumstances, and identities were not necessarily known to the writer. It could surprise, frustrate, or embarrass the person who appropriated it.

The synthetic critic offers no comparable resistance. Even disagreement is delivered as a service.

Thorne may accuse Gordon of aesthetic vanity, but he cannot refuse to participate in the performance. Vale may condemn her political irresponsibility, but they will not issue an unsolicited statement repudiating the use of their likeness. Hale may find Gordon insufficiently courageous, but she cannot challenge the representation of her own literary values. Every objection has been anticipated by the person who commissioned it.

There is a revealing moment in Thorne’s essay when he accuses Gordon of constructing an aesthetic system capable of transforming its deficiencies into the evidence of its own sophistication. The charge seems considerably more applicable to the gallery of critics than to the poetry it purports to examine. Whatever objection one raises against the project can simply become the basis of another installment. A reader finds the criticism too flattering? Produce a hostile critic. The hostility seems excessively academic? Produce an angry activist. The activist seems predictable? Produce a sentimental mainstream poet. The entire enterprise appears narcissistic and mechanically generated? Commission a critic who condemns narcissism and mechanical generation.

One can continue this procedure indefinitely, and I suspect Gordon intends to do precisely that.

I can already imagine the next critic. He will be a middle-aged literary essayist, perhaps educated at Yale, with a reputation for irascibility and a somewhat antiquated attachment to the independence of human judgment. He will have written several books lamenting the deterioration of literary culture. He will dislike artificial intelligence, resent the speed with which it manufactures seemingly competent prose, and regard this project as an especially depressing illustration of contemporary intellectual frivolity. His biography will mention an obscure literary quarterly that ceased publication some years ago. His photograph will probably be unflattering.

He may even be made to employ the expression “dead in the water.”

And when his essay appears, readers will be invited to appreciate the delicious irony of an AI-generated critic denouncing AI-generated criticism.

I cannot imagine a less interesting joke.

Its mechanism is obvious, and its success requires nothing beyond the continuation of the process it supposedly exposes. The machine has been asked to produce an argument against its own use, and it has complied. We are then expected to regard the compliance as a sophisticated commentary upon the instability of authorship.

But a system’s ability to imitate an objection does not constitute an answer to that objection.

The question remains whether anything resembling literary judgment is taking place. I would suggest that it is not. The gallery supplies the experience of being criticized without the inconvenience of encountering an independent critic. Its inhabitants have no intellectual commitments beyond those assigned to them, no reputations that might suffer from their errors, and no capacity to revise their judgments in response to experiences their creator has not anticipated.

Actual criticism is considerably less convenient. A critic may misunderstand a writer for reasons the writer cannot predict. She may recognize something the writer has failed to see. She may be indifferent to the work, refuse to review it, or produce an essay whose implications the author finds genuinely intolerable. These possibilities arise from the elementary fact that the critic has a life and a mind independent of the author.

I do not wish to romanticize the literary profession. Much published criticism is mediocre, derivative, self-serving, or plainly incompetent. I have spent a considerable portion of my career saying so. Nor do I deny that a language model may occasionally produce a useful observation, a felicitous formulation, or even a line of argument worth pursuing. Thorne’s remarks about self-consciousness and aesthetic exoneration suggest that such moments are possible.

But the occurrence of an intelligent sentence does not settle the question of what kind of activity has produced it. Literary criticism derives its significance partly from the commitment of a person to a judgment and from that person’s willingness to expose the judgment to disagreement. The synthetic critic performs the outward signs of such commitment while remaining constitutionally incapable of possessing it.

I suspect Gordon would reply that her gallery is a theatrical experiment, that the critics are deliberately exaggerated representations of recognizable literary attitudes, and that the project is less concerned with receiving genuine judgments than with exploring the rhetoric of judgment itself.

This is a defensible description of what she is doing. It is also one that considerably reduces the project’s claim to novelty. Writers have been inventing satirical interlocutors, fictitious reviewers, and elaborate critical personae for centuries. The difference here is that much of the labor of characterization and composition has been delegated to a system capable of producing a serviceable approximation of almost any familiar discursive style.

I remain unconvinced that this delegation has generated anything of substantial literary interest. Gordon’s project reveals how readily certain kinds of criticism can be imitated, but it tells us surprisingly little about the critics beyond the prejudices with which they were initially supplied. Its satirical targets are already familiar, and its chief source of pleasure appears to lie in the rapid reproduction of their most recognizable characteristics.

What troubles me, finally, is the possibility that the gallery represents a retreat from precisely the encounters that have made Gordon’s poetry worth reading. Her work, at its best, has engaged with the unruly linguistic world beyond the poet’s immediate control. Here she has constructed a literary environment in which even antagonism arrives according to specification. Everyone has something to say about her, everyone can be induced to say it at whatever length she desires, and nobody can decline the invitation.

Perhaps I am taking the enterprise too seriously. Perhaps its creator regards the whole business as an elaborate joke, and my objections merely demonstrate the familiar inability of the literary conservative to recognize contemporary play.

I have heard that defense before, and I expect to hear it again.

Yet I keep returning to the question with which I began. Why would a poet who has spent decades developing a distinctive sensibility wish to devote so much energy to manufacturing imaginary responses to her own work? There are actual readers in the world, some of whom might have something unexpected to say about it. There are actual critics, however reluctant or distracted, whose judgments cannot be revised by the author. There is even the possibility that no one will be interested enough to respond.

That last possibility seems to me especially important. The silence of another person is an experience a writer must sometimes endure. It is one of the conditions of publishing work in a world populated by people whose attention belongs to them.

The machine offers an apparently inexhaustible substitute for that silence. It will always produce another critic, another opinion, another elaborately credentialed personality, another sympathetic or hostile face. There need never be a moment when the writer confronts the possibility that no one wishes to speak.

I find that prospect considerably more depressing than the occasional stupidity of an actual literary review.

Gordon’s gallery is dead in the water. Its fifth critic, should she choose to manufacture him, will be no more capable of rescuing it than the first four.

And if his objections are subsequently incorporated into the entertainment, I hope readers will at least recognize how little that accomplishment proves.


About the author

Malcolm R. Sedgewick is an essayist, literary critic, and former editor of the independent literary quarterly The Human Measure, which ceased publication in 2017. He is the author of The Trouble with Play: Irony and the Evacuation of Meaning (2006), The Vanishing Reader: On Attention, Difficulty, and the Literary Life (2018), and Against the Machine: Literature and the Abdication of Judgment (2025). His essays and reviews have appeared in Harper’s, The New York Review of Books, The New Republic, and The Hudson Review. He received his Ph.D. in English from Yale University and has taught at several New England colleges. A longtime critic of technological solutionism and the commercial degradation of literary culture, he lives in Northampton, Massachusetts. He does not maintain a social media presence.

Malcolm R. Sedgewick, fictional literary critic

Editorial note: Malcolm R. Sedgewick is a fictional literary critic. This essay was developed through a collaborative dialogue between Nada Gordon and ChatGPT, using the same artificial intelligence technology its purported author so vehemently condemns.

The Alibi of Excess: Bad Faith, Appropriation, and the Exhaustion of Nada Gordon’s Poetics

Surreal doll-like figure encrusted with pearls, roses, lace, jewelry, and multiple staring eyes

By Adrian V. Thorne

The central difficulty presented by Nada Gordon’s poetry is not that it is obscure, extravagant, vulgar, or indifferent to the conventional satisfactions of lyric form. These properties have long since ceased to constitute serious challenges to an educated readership, particularly one accustomed to the institutional conventions of experimental writing. Gordon’s difficulty lies elsewhere: in the extraordinary ingenuity with which her poetry converts its possible deficiencies into the grounds of its own vindication. Prolixity becomes abundance; arbitrary association becomes linguistic freedom; compositional negligence becomes an openness to accident; appropriation becomes evidence of the collective nature of language; and self-indulgence, that most obvious objection to the work, is anticipated and extravagantly caricatured before a critic can adequately formulate it. What results is an aesthetic so accomplished at representing its own contradictions that representation repeatedly substitutes for responsibility. The poet knows that she is vain, excessive, compromised, acquisitive, inconsistent, and intermittently ridiculous. She takes pains to demonstrate this knowledge. Yet the acknowledgment of a deficiency does not establish its aesthetic value, still less its ethical legitimacy. Gordon’s fundamental confusion is to treat self-awareness as though it were a form of exoneration, as though the performance of critical intelligence absolved the artist from the consequences of what that intelligence discovers.

The confusion is visible in the briefest of her characteristic gestures. In “Gorgeous,” a sprawling sequence of fragmentary poems collected in The Sound Princess, Gordon writes:

granite taken for styrofoam
out of the doldrums
and into—pardon me—puissance

The joke is neatly timed. The incongruity between granite and Styrofoam establishes an initial disturbance of material expectation; the familiar phrase about escaping the doldrums prepares an energetic transition; and the ostentatious abstraction “puissance” arrives with an apology that invites the reader to enjoy the pretension without condemning it. But the apology does not modify the pretension. It provides a means of preserving it. Gordon’s characteristic self-heckling allows her to perform a questionable rhetorical action and immediately assume the superior position of the person who recognizes its questionable character. The reader is thus expected to admire both the extravagance and the sophistication of its dismissal. This is not the relinquishment of authorial vanity but its multiplication. The poet becomes performer, audience, and critic of her own performance, with the considerable advantage that every objection can be incorporated into the entertainment.

The more serious problem with “Gorgeous” is structural. Its discontinuous fragments generate an atmosphere of unlimited linguistic possibility, but the poem offers remarkably few means of distinguishing an indispensable verbal discovery from an attractive accident. Consider:

otter games and
more distantly
the water (wonder) horse

The parenthetical transformation is charming, but its charm should not be confused with necessity. The addition of “wonder” creates a momentary oscillation between an aquatic animal and a creature of fabulous possibility. The mechanism is transparent; what remains obscure is why the resulting transformation should matter beyond the immediate recognition of its ingenuity. Elsewhere, “wine-lush musk (muscle*)” or “toe painted topaz or roan” performs a comparable operation of phonetic or semantic disturbance. Such effects can be repeated almost indefinitely, and their indefinite repeatability is precisely the difficulty. Gordon’s poems do not merely invite readers to recognize associative possibilities. They repeatedly imply that the recognition itself constitutes an artistic achievement. What is absent is a sufficiently discriminating account of why one possibility should be retained and another abandoned.

One might compare this procedure with George Oppen’s fragmentary propositions, but the comparison exposes the weakness of Gordon’s achievement. In Oppen, the interruption of utterance registers a resistance encountered by thought in its effort to remain answerable to things. In Gordon, interruption frequently provides the opportunity to escape a relation before it acquires consequences. The fragment “working mind’s fumbling ‘greatness’” might be regarded as a moment of self-suspicion, while “love of blurbs, of visibility” announces the vanity of literary aspiration. But the knowledge produced by such admissions is curiously inert. Vanity has been acknowledged, and the poem proceeds. The governing assumption seems to be that an artist who can identify her own motives has thereby subjected them to adequate criticism.

The danger is that the poem’s apparently radical openness conceals a deeply conservative attachment to an established repertoire of effects. Gordon’s verbal surfaces are crowded with bodily curiosities, exotic lexical materials, ornamental textures, parenthetical qualifications, and ostentatiously comic collisions. Yet the procedures through which these materials are transformed remain remarkably stable. “Gorgeous” repeatedly astonishes at the level of the phrase while becoming predictable at the level of compositional behavior. Its novelty is continuous and therefore increasingly unremarkable. The poem’s apparent refusal of formula has become a formula for producing the appearance of refusal.

“Professional Poem,” from Emotional Support Peacock, reduces the problem to an almost embarrassing simplicity:

O subchanters of the malversation,
you heriots of gemallion ell …
why all this drogulus? this axiopisty? this phit?

Here the sound of intellectual difficulty appears to have become a sufficient substitute for the intellectual relations through which difficulty might acquire value. The poem borrows the gestures of elevated address, rhetorical interrogation, and specialized knowledge, but the resulting performance has little direction beyond the accumulation of improbable language. A further succession of lexical inventions would alter the poem’s atmosphere without appreciably modifying its implications. The title supplies an additional irony by suggesting that the poem is implicated in the very professionalized literary culture its extravagant diction presumably mocks. But this self-implication again performs a suspiciously convenient function. Having made the professional poem ridiculous, Gordon can continue producing it without accepting the burden of demonstrating why this particular instance deserves preservation.

The ideological implications of this position become more pronounced in “Complexexity,” where Gordon begins:

not the opposite of simperplicity.
Rather, the opposite of obvivoidousness.

The poem’s invented vocabulary is intended to complicate the very possibility of a stable distinction between simplicity and complexity. Yet the position is less demanding than its typography suggests. A relatively ordinary opposition has been elaborated through morphological interference, and the interference presents itself as intellectual activity. Gordon subsequently mocks the demand for accessible evidence of perception, characterizing the desire for straightforward understanding through a contemptuous account of readers who expect the writer to have looked directly at something. Her suspicion of transparency is not without justification. But the poem supplies no adequate reason to conclude that deliberately complicated expression is more faithful to experience than the clarity it derides. The distortion of language is offered as evidence that language has been critically examined, when it may demonstrate no more than the poet’s willingness to subject words to familiar operations of deformation.

More troublingly, the poem’s conclusion abandons its polemical pressure in favor of an ornamental image:

A brass filigree polygonal lamp into which many glass jewels have been set.

The lamp is an attractive object, but its presence reveals something of Gordon’s argumentative predicament. The poem has moved from an inadequately established distinction among kinds of writing to a decorative object whose intricacy appears intended to vindicate complexity through sensory appeal. The aesthetic example replaces the intellectual demonstration. One is not required to dislike the lamp to question the logic by which its beauty is made to settle the preceding dispute. Gordon repeatedly treats ornamental complexity as though its sheer desirability established the validity of the conceptual claims made on its behalf. The result is less an argument than a series of invitations to admire the poet’s taste.

This habit achieves its fullest expression in “Poetry Is Junk,” the elaborate appropriative manifesto that establishes ornament as both a feminist counterpractice and a model of collective linguistic production. Against the austerities of Adolf Loos, Gordon assembles a luxuriant inventory of fabrics, flowers, bodily secretions, erotic practices, decorative objects, quotations, and verbal extravagances. The poem’s principal defense of appropriation is expressed with disarming simplicity:

Expression irrigates expression.

The formulation is attractive precisely because it replaces the asymmetries of actual cultural exchange with the image of a naturally fertile circulation. But the metaphor accomplishes its work by suppressing distinctions that any serious ethics of appropriation must preserve. The words of other writers, advertisers, anonymous speakers, and historically marginalized subjects do not become ethically equivalent simply because all language participates in inherited systems of expression. Nor does the collective nature of linguistic production abolish the difference between quotation and extraction, dialogue and ventriloquism, transformation and aesthetic consumption.

Gordon’s insistence that “Your own handwriting is collective,” borrowed in turn from Drew Gardner, is a proposition about the social conditions of language, not a comprehensive justification for every act of appropriation. Yet Gordon treats the proposition as an expansive authorization. Her declaration:

I’m all apertures.

appears to dissolve the boundaries of the lyric self while in practice licensing an extraordinary expansion of authorial possession. Everything can enter the poem because everything can be subjected to the recognizable operations of Gordon’s sensibility. The apparent surrender of individuality conceals the consolidation of an intensely proprietary artistic personality. The poet claims not to own the language she uses, but the work’s distinctive identity depends upon transforming the language of others into something unmistakably hers.

The extravagance of the poem’s imagery compounds the problem. When Gordon announces:

I run a mermaid ranch in my
eerie birth canal

the grotesque fusion of bodily interiority and fabulous enterprise is supposed to establish both the comic instability of the lyric subject and the generative freedom of language. Yet the image is characteristic of a procedure that has become largely automatic: an anatomical reference is joined to an incongruous imaginary object, and the resulting collision is presented as evidence of the extraordinary possibilities of artistic consciousness. Its sexual audacity is less significant than its predictability. The reader familiar with Gordon’s work has learned to expect precisely this sort of conjunction. What was once an experiment in decorum has become a decorative convention of its own.

Her defense of appropriation is particularly compromised by the poem’s declaration:

I steal with love and
out of sympathy.

The statement is revealing because it offers intention as the ethical guarantee of an act whose consequences are not thereby established. Love may motivate appropriation; it does not settle its legitimacy. Sympathy may inform the transformation of another person’s language; it does not establish that the transformation preserves, acknowledges, or adequately interrogates the circumstances of its source. Gordon’s insistence upon the affectionate character of her borrowing risks becoming a refined version of the familiar assumption that benevolent intentions place aesthetic conduct beyond ethical scrutiny. Her work does not consistently examine what its appropriations cost, what they obscure, or what relations of power they reproduce. The pleasure of incorporation is too readily mistaken for evidence of generosity.

“Coney Island Avenue” presents the problem in a more socially consequential form. The poem’s energetic catalogue of the immigrant and religious cultures encountered along a Brooklyn bus route has frequently been admired as a celebration of urban multiplicity. Gordon notices shops, advertisements, clothing, food, signs, bodies, and fragments of language with remarkable enthusiasm. But enthusiasm is not synonymous with attention, and attention is not automatically an ethical virtue. The catalogue’s accumulation of culturally specific surfaces repeatedly threatens to convert the neighborhood’s inhabitants into materials for a mobile observer’s aesthetic performance. The institutions and businesses possess names and histories that matter within the lives of the people who sustain them; within the poem, they become available principally as stimuli to association.

Gordon briefly acknowledges the possible historical violence of such spectatorship:

Who is “they”? The Westerners, of course

Yet the acknowledgment is characteristic of the poem’s larger evasions. The possibility of imperial or appropriative looking is identified, incorporated into the verbal movement, and displaced before it can impose any decisive limitation upon the poet’s appetite. Recognition becomes another form of permission. The speaker’s apparent susceptibility to the visual and cultural world is therefore inseparable from an extraordinarily assertive power to reorganize that world as a sequence of verbal pleasures.

The poem’s conclusion is still more revealing:

And then the paralyzing rush of emotion:

grace infuses whirling faces
with a dissonant gaiety.

This apparent lyric culmination is constructed through the transformation of language from Frank O’Hara’s Second Avenue, including his reference to Grace Hartigan. The proper name becomes an abstract principle; O’Hara’s language of artistic disturbance is reorganized into an experience of transcendent urban perception. The transformation is ingenious, but its ingenuity should not obscure the aesthetic convenience of the procedure. At the very moment when Gordon’s extended catalogue requires some principle of conclusion, another poet’s language arrives to supply the appearance of emotional revelation. The poem has not simply borrowed vocabulary. It has borrowed an already constituted structure of lyric intensity.

One could argue that such appropriation demonstrates the genuinely collective nature of poetic feeling. But the argument overlooks the distinction between the shared historical availability of language and the particular formal obligation to make that language consequential within a new work. Gordon’s transformation may produce beauty, but it does so through an imported authority whose presence complicates the claim that the preceding accumulation has generated the revelation organically. The borrowed lines are less the inevitable culmination of the poem than an exceptionally elegant means of ending it.

The rejection of sincerity, one of the more persistent theoretical commitments of Gordon’s work, operates through a comparable confusion. It is reasonable to recognize that emotional expression is mediated by rhetoric, cultural convention, and the instability of the speaking subject. It is considerably less reasonable to conclude that sincerity therefore constitutes an intellectually discredited aspiration. Gordon’s poems repeatedly convert emotional vulnerability into rhetorical performance, as though the awareness that feeling is constructed required its immediate contamination by irony. The result is a lyric practice capable of extraordinary emotional intensity but frequently unwilling to endure that intensity without protective qualification.

“Dismay” demonstrates the distinction with unusual clarity. After an opening of characteristic lexical complication, the speaker asks whether imitation of a rival might provide access to the beloved’s emotional world. The poem then abandons its elaborate abstractions:

I can’t
get her haircut: I don’t
have that kind of hair.

The passage is devastating precisely because the emotional problem has acquired an irreducibly material form. The speaker cannot reproduce the rival’s desirability because she cannot reproduce the rival’s body. Here Gordon’s verbal inventiveness encounters a circumstance it cannot simply transform. The subsequent declaration:

I’m better than she is,
who does not think of you,
just as you do not think
of me.

is equally affecting in its resentful simplicity. But these passages also reveal how much of the surrounding verbal complication may be unnecessary to the poem’s achievement. The intensity arises not from the extravagant proliferation of language but from the temporary suspension of that proliferation. The speaker has ceased to protect herself through invention and has permitted an emotional proposition to remain exposed.

“Mauvais Song,” from Emotional Support Peacock, is similarly instructive. Its opening recollection of a former poetic plenitude possesses genuine lyric force:

Once everything was magnolian

The invented adjective is unusually effective because it does more than advertise lexical ingenuity. It condenses floral exuberance, nostalgia, and a sense of vanished perceptual possibility. The poem then recalls a time when language seemed capable of transforming experience:

I was in love with this garbled feeling.

The admission is unusually suggestive. Gordon’s attachment is not simply to poetry’s representational power but to the very disturbance through which language makes experience available as a source of pleasure. Yet the poem subsequently becomes a lament for the erosion of that capacity. The speaker is distracted by her phone, diminished by contemporary anxieties, and unable to recover an earlier relation to verbal abundance.

At this point, however, the familiar machinery of comic rhyme and self-interruption begins to operate:

I hop on a point,
I skip on a line

The lines are intended to acknowledge the poet’s awareness of her own mannerisms, but their jaunty movement threatens to trivialize the loss the poem has introduced. Later, the speaker confesses:

Busily trying to fill up a page.

One might regard this admission as disarming candor. It is also a remarkably accurate description of a compositional habit whose results Gordon too often treats as valuable simply because they have been produced. The poem’s dissatisfaction with its own procedures becomes another occasion for their repetition.

The subsequent declaration:

I’ve got sand in my thoughts

is more promising because it allows the deterioration of verbal productivity to acquire an image of abrasive material resistance. But Gordon cannot remain with it. The poem resumes its transformations, moving from sand to appetite to the lubricious abundance of consciousness, as though the very recognition that the mechanism is failing could be overcome through renewed operation of the mechanism. The work presents a poet who recognizes that her habitual resources are inadequate to her circumstances, yet appears unwilling to relinquish them.

The problem is not that irony and sincerity are incompatible. It is that Gordon repeatedly invokes their incompatibility as a means of avoiding the responsibility of either. A statement can be offered as emotionally serious until its seriousness becomes embarrassing, at which point it may be reclaimed as comic performance. Conversely, a joke can register a genuine grievance until that grievance becomes vulnerable to objection, at which point the speaker may retreat into the joke’s apparent inconsequence. Such writing possesses an enviable rhetorical flexibility, but the flexibility is purchased through a refusal to specify the conditions under which the poet’s utterances might be held accountable.

“Genius Grant: A Hateful Sestina” demonstrates the procedure at the level of institutional criticism. Its opening assertion:

Any idiot can get a genius grant

establishes the poem’s contempt for the procedures through which literary distinction is distributed. Yet the satire is complicated by the speaker’s unmistakable desire for precisely the forms of recognition she mocks. The sequence of fellowships, residencies, craft talks, and tenure tracks becomes a machinery of resentment whose repetitive structure allows the poet to enjoy both denunciation and longing.

The poem’s transformations of “tenure track” into related sounds are frequently amusing, but their accumulation does not deepen the institutional argument. The sestina’s elaborate formal machinery provides repeated opportunities to perform a settled attitude. The poet knows that her desire for recognition is compromised. She makes that knowledge funny. What she does not do is permit the contradiction to become sufficiently consequential to transform her position. The result is less an investigation of artistic prestige than an exceptionally accomplished form of grievance management.

“Sturm,” Gordon’s extended meditation on the difficulty of writing about Hurricane Sandy, offers the most disturbing instance of this tendency because the work’s evasions take place in relation to actual historical suffering. The speaker acknowledges her lack of direct experience of the catastrophe and considers several possible formal responses. She rejects documentary enumeration, parody, visual arrangement, and various established poetic methods as inadequate to the occasion. Her hesitation is often presented as evidence of ethical seriousness, but ethical seriousness cannot be demonstrated merely through the recognition of ethical difficulty.

The poem’s documentary passage enumerates the consequences of the hurricane with a directness unusual in Gordon’s work. It includes displaced residents, damaged infrastructure, lost power, and the suffering of people whose circumstances were dramatically unlike the speaker’s. Yet Gordon rapidly dismisses the material:

This isn’t a poem at this point.
It is an article.

The distinction deserves considerably more scrutiny than the speaker allows it. Why should an inventory of damaged lives and institutions be aesthetically deficient merely because it preserves their historical particularity? Why should the poem’s achievement depend upon the conversion of these materials into a formal analogue of meteorological turbulence? The assertion that reportage is insufficiently poetic is not an ethical conclusion but an aesthetic preference, one that becomes suspicious when it permits the poet to abandon the claims of historical specificity in favor of her habitual procedures of verbal invention.

The poem subsequently offers an even more revealing diagnosis of its predicament:

Flarf is too smartass, conceptualism too
cold, docupo too earnest and langpo too dated.

The reductive neatness of these judgments is striking. Each literary practice is dismissed through an exaggerated caricature of its characteristic limitation, and the resulting panorama of inadequacy produces the appearance of comprehensive philosophical skepticism. But the argument is intellectually lazy. To identify a possible weakness within a method is not to demonstrate that every realization of the method is compromised. Gordon’s reductio ad absurdum substitutes the ease of satirical dismissal for the difficulty of discrimination. Once every available practice has been found wanting, the poet’s inability to determine an adequate alternative becomes a principled impasse rather than an avoidable failure of judgment.

The most damaging moment arrives when Gordon acknowledges:

There is no reason for the linebreaks here except to mark it
as a poem

This is not merely a confession of formal uncertainty. It is an admission that a significant element of the work’s presentation lacks a persuasive compositional justification. The poet immediately associates the decision with her payment for the commission, thereby making the poem’s formal inadequacy part of a comic account of artistic labor. But the acknowledgment does not establish the necessity of the line breaks. Their function remains what the speaker has identified it as being: the conventional designation of otherwise prosaic material as poetry. Gordon has discovered a means of making negligence entertaining without demonstrating that negligence has become artistically consequential.

The ensuing passage of lexical turbulence attempts to recover poetry through an extravagant proliferation of unfamiliar words and grotesque associations. But its procedures are virtually indistinguishable from those employed throughout Gordon’s work. The hurricane has supplied an occasion for the performance, not an organizing demand capable of transforming it. The world is again absorbed into the recognizable habits of the poet’s sensibility. What purports to be an encounter with the inadequacy of language becomes a renewed exhibition of linguistic facility.

The poem’s philosophical culmination is perhaps the most explicit statement of Gordon’s governing bad faith. Rewriting Seamus Heaney’s conception of poetic responsibility, she proposes that poetry might make the writer:

a more artificial, tainted,
fragmented creature.

The opposition is rhetorically effective but conceptually evasive. Heaney’s aspirations toward truth and wholeness are dismissed as insufficiently attentive to artifice, while Gordon’s preference for fragmentation acquires the status of a competing ethical ideal. Yet nothing about the mediated nature of language establishes that artificiality is intrinsically more responsible than sincerity, or that fragmentation is more intellectually demanding than the attempt to establish relations among fragments. Gordon has simply reversed a set of values whose authority she refuses to examine. The inversion creates the appearance of philosophical radicalism while preserving the comforting simplicity of the original opposition.

Her subsequent recognition that the poem is not finally about the hurricane but about the wrongness of poetic forms is equally convenient. The catastrophe, having resisted her attempts at representation, becomes the occasion for a self-reflexive meditation on the inadequacy of representation itself. The poet’s failure is redescribed as the discovery of her true subject. This is the central maneuver of Gordon’s aesthetic in its most ethically consequential form: failure becomes not something to be overcome or accepted as failure, but the generative principle through which the work secures its claim to achievement.

A comparable mechanism operates in “A Conversation,” from Folly, where Gordon stages an exchange with an editor who questions the manuscript’s organization. The editor objects to its excessive dependence upon gesture and demands a more propositional account of its intellectual ambitions. Gordon replies by explaining the structure of the book and its relation to Erasmus, while the personified figure of Folly supplies comic interruptions. Eventually the editor announces:

This is still entirely gestural.

His objection has by this point become part of the performance whose adequacy he is attempting to assess. The poet’s inability or unwillingness to provide a satisfactory response has been converted into theatrical material, and the scene’s comic vitality threatens to make the objection seem irrelevant. Yet the editor has not been answered. He has been incorporated.

This is perhaps the clearest demonstration of Gordon’s capacity to transform criticism into an extension of the work’s authority. The objection is acknowledged, dramatized, made amusing, and left without consequence. The work congratulates itself on the honesty of staging its own inadequacies while proceeding exactly as before. Such reflexivity may appear intellectually sophisticated, but it is also an extraordinarily effective means of avoiding revision. The poet’s ability to describe a weakness becomes an argument for preserving it.

Gordon’s later poem “Sabishii” reveals the exhaustion of this procedure in a more melancholy register. Its accumulation of obsolete household objects, damaged toys, unfashionable clothing, discarded decorations, and peculiar consumer products suggests an inquiry into the relationship between language and abandonment. Yet the objects increasingly appear interchangeable within a compositional system whose governing principle is the endless conversion of material particularity into verbal stimulus. The speaker declares:

It is a begging for language.

The formulation is revealing. The poem’s longing is directed less toward the objects themselves than toward the continuation of the linguistic activity they make possible. The discarded materials acquire value because they can be transformed into words, but the transformations seldom establish why these particular objects should matter beyond their contribution to the poet’s associative productivity.

The poem’s repeated insistence upon pleasure becomes increasingly desperate. Its verbal abundance no longer guarantees the emotional satisfaction that originally justified the procedure, yet the procedure continues. Gordon appears to recognize the emptiness of its repetition without being able to abandon it. What might have become a genuinely moving examination of diminished artistic and emotional possibility is repeatedly dispersed through further acts of invention. The poem’s sadness is inseparable from the spectacle of a poet whose accustomed resources have ceased to reassure her, but whose attachment to those resources remains almost compulsive.

One is tempted to describe the resulting aesthetic as nihilistic, though the term requires precision. Gordon is not indifferent to value in any comprehensive philosophical sense. Her poetry remains passionately attached to beauty, pleasure, comedy, erotic experience, and the sensuous properties of language. Its nihilism is selective and opportunistic, emerging at those moments when evaluative distinctions threaten to impose obligations upon the work. If every form is compromised, no specific deficiency requires correction. If all language is already appropriated, no particular appropriation demands justification. If sincerity is necessarily rhetorical, no utterance need remain answerable to its emotional claims. If artistic failure can be transformed into self-reflexive commentary, failure itself loses its capacity to compel revision.

This is nihilism not as a doctrine of meaninglessness but as an instrument for avoiding the consequences of meaning. Gordon’s poems want the pleasures of value without submitting to its restrictions. They want beauty without the necessity of distinguishing beauty from stimulation, critical intelligence without the obligation to accept criticism, and artistic freedom without the discipline of consequential choice.

The contrast with artists such as Agnes Martin and Gerhard Richter is instructive not because they exemplify a simplistic alternative of austerity to Gordon’s abundance, but because their work demonstrates the centrality of discrimination within artistic procedure. Martin’s repetitions derive their force from an exacting attention to differences of interval, pressure, and proportion. Richter’s surfaces are produced through processes of application, revision, obscuration, and erasure that refuse to preserve every successful effect merely because it has occurred. Their practices acknowledge the generative possibilities of accident without confusing generation with achievement.

Gordon, by comparison, often gives the impression of an artist unable to relinquish a phrase once its ingenuity has become apparent. The ornate, obscene, ridiculous, or lexically extravagant effect is preserved because it is pleasurable, while the question of its necessity within the larger composition is displaced by an argument about pleasure’s legitimacy. Yet the legitimacy of pleasure is not in question. What requires examination is the relation between particular pleasures and the form that contains them. Gordon repeatedly answers that question by producing another pleasure.

The result is a body of work of extraordinary verbal facility and uncertain artistic necessity. Its best passages demonstrate that Gordon possesses the capacity for genuine lyric concentration, but their effectiveness often depends upon the temporary suspension of the procedures most conspicuously identified with her poetics. The bodily specificity of the haircut in “Dismay,” the opening recollection of linguistic plenitude in “Mauvais Song,” and the occasional moments of perceptual precision scattered throughout The Sound Princess reveal an artist capable of allowing an image or emotional relation to impose limits upon verbal invention. But such moments remain vulnerable to the poet’s habitual desire for further elaboration. Her intelligence repeatedly rescues her from the danger of being insufficiently ingenious, while exposing her to the more consequential danger of being ingenious without sufficient cause.

The principal objection to Gordon’s poetry is therefore not that it permits too much, but that it demands too little of what it permits. The work’s celebrated openness conceals a remarkable resistance to being transformed by the materials it receives. The cultural reference, the borrowed line, the emotional confession, the grotesque image, and the objection to the poem’s own procedure are all subjected to an aesthetic system whose principal achievement is the indefinite preservation of its freedom to continue. Nothing can finally interrupt the performance because interruption itself has become one of its most reliable effects.

Gordon’s defenders have frequently mistaken this indefatigability for artistic courage. Yet there is little courage in a poetics that has made itself almost entirely immune to the possibility of recognizable failure. The poet confesses her vanity before vanity can be condemned; acknowledges her sloppiness before sloppiness can be criticized; ridicules her own institutional ambitions before their contradictions can become embarrassing; and explains her appropriations through a theory of collective language that renders the question of their particular consequences conveniently secondary. Every anticipated objection becomes another element of the work’s self-advertisement. The poet can be wrong only in ways that demonstrate how intelligently she understands the possibility of being wrong.

What this aesthetic finally lacks is not sincerity, coherence, seriousness, or restraint in their conventional manifestations. It lacks a sufficiently demanding account of artistic responsibility, one capable of distinguishing the recognition of a problem from the difficult work of responding to it. Gordon’s poetry continually exposes its own limitations while insisting, implicitly or explicitly, that the exposure has transformed those limitations into accomplishments. The claim is untenable. Self-consciousness is not self-criticism, and self-criticism without the possibility of revision is merely another form of self-regard.

The most dispiriting quality of the work is consequently not its extravagance but its atmosphere of perpetual exoneration. Everything has already been excused: the cliché because it is quoted, the obscenity because it is theatrical, the incoherence because it is deliberate, the sentiment because it is mocked, the appropriation because language is collective, the sloppiness because accident is productive, and the failure because the poem has exposed the impossibility of success. Aesthetic freedom has become a comprehensive system of insurance against aesthetic judgment.

Gordon’s considerable talent makes this predicament more rather than less consequential. An artist of lesser intelligence might have remained innocent of the contradictions that characterize her work. Gordon understands them and repeatedly converts that understanding into the means of their preservation. Her poetry has made an extraordinary art of avoiding the last word, but the refusal has itself become an increasingly predictable conclusion.

One begins to suspect that the essential gesture of Gordon’s mature poetics is not the liberation of language from constraint, but the liberation of the poet from the obligation to determine what language has accomplished.

And this, whatever its theoretical elaborations, is not a radical aesthetic achievement. It is an evasion.


Works discussed: Nada Gordon, Folly (Roof Books, 2007); Vile Lilt (Roof Books, 2013); The Sound Princess: Selected Poems 1985–2015 (Subpress Collective, 2024); Emotional Support Peacock (BlazeVOX, 2024); and selected theatrical works.

About the author

Adrian V. Thorne is a fictional literary critic and the author of The Exhaustion of Transgression: Avant-Garde Form After Its Institutional Triumph (2009) and Against the Alibi: Sincerity, Bad Faith, and the Limits of Irony (2018). His current project, The Right to Be Boring: Aesthetics After the Cult of Novelty, remains in preparation.

Adrian V. Thorne, fictional literary critic

Editorial note: Adrian V. Thorne is a fictional scholarly persona. This essay was developed through an extended critical dialogue between Nada Gordon and ChatGPT.

The Ornamental and the Unseemly: On the Poetry of Nada Gordon

By Mira K. Vell

The extraordinary profusion of language in Nada Gordon’s poetry presents a difficulty for criticism that is not adequately addressed by invoking the usual vocabulary of experimental writing: disjunction, appropriation, polyphony, linguistic materiality, the destabilization of the lyric subject. Although all these terms describe important aspects of her practice, they tend to subordinate the sensuous particularity of her poems to a set of already familiar propositions about the nature of language. Gordon’s work, however, is distinguished not merely by its interrogation of signification but by an appetite for the physical, ornamental, erotic, and sometimes repellent properties of words, an appetite that persists even when the poems appear to distrust the legitimacy of such pleasures. Her poetry is extravagant, but its extravagance is never simply an assertion of freedom from constraint; it is continually interrupted by embarrassment, critical self-awareness, emotional vulnerability, and an almost compulsive need to argue with the conditions of its own production. The poems simultaneously pursue and ridicule poetic magnificence, exposing the cultural mechanisms through which some forms of verbal display acquire the dignity of art while others are dismissed as vulgar, feminine, excessive, or ridiculous. This conflict is not incidental to Gordon’s style. It generates the peculiar instability of her lyric voice, a voice capable of the most elaborate rhetorical exhibitionism while refusing to exempt its own performance from skeptical scrutiny. The resulting poetry is not merely ludic, nor does its comedy function as an agreeable disguise for an otherwise solemn intellectual project. Rather, its pleasures and its critical intelligence are frequently inseparable from one another, producing an art in which seriousness becomes most interesting at the moment when it is threatened by ridicule.

The historical complexity of Gordon’s work becomes clearer when its relation to the American experimental tradition is considered alongside intellectual and aesthetic inheritances that do not fit comfortably within that tradition’s conventional genealogies. The associative freedoms of John Ashbery and Frank O’Hara, the procedural investigations of Bernadette Mayer, Clark Coolidge’s improvisational attention to the sonic and material properties of words, and Language poetry’s sustained interrogation of reference and expressive subjectivity provide essential contexts for her writing, but they do not exhaust its ambitions. Mina Loy’s erotic and intellectual ferocity, Lewis Carroll’s systematic nonsense, the metaphysical conceits of George Herbert, the artificial paradises of Huysmans, and the theatrical, cinematic, and poetic experiments of Terayama Shūji offer equally suggestive points of comparison. These affiliations cannot be understood as a harmonious synthesis of compatible influences. The skepticism toward transparent expression associated with Language writing is not readily reconciled with Gordon’s unabashed investment in lyric affect; the compactness of Japanese short-form poetry appears initially incompatible with her seemingly inexhaustible elaborations; and the ornamental artificiality of decadence coexists uneasily with the improvisatory inclusiveness of the New York School. What gives Gordon’s writing its distinctive character is precisely the persistence of these tensions. Her poetry does not resolve them into a coherent aesthetic program but discovers in their interference a means of generating new forms of experience. Her participation in Flarf, moreover, should be understood within this longer history rather than made to account retroactively for the earlier work. The poems collected in The Sound Princess: Selected Poems 1985–2015 demonstrate that her investigations of linguistic accident, bodily experience, borrowed discourse, and unstable subjectivity were underway well before the emergence of Flarf as a recognizable movement. What the internet and the collective procedures of Flarf made newly available was an enormously expanded archive of verbal material through which preexisting aesthetic interests could be pursued.

One of Gordon’s most illuminating descriptions of her own compositional activity involves the figure of the hermit crab, a creature that inhabits a structure it has not itself produced. The metaphor suggests a relation to inherited forms that differs both from conventional imitation and from appropriation understood as the neutral transfer of material into a new context. Gordon has described a practice of looking at an existing text, sometimes almost squinting at it, and allowing the visible and audible properties of words to suggest alternative language, producing substitutions that may begin as parody or pastiche but eventually acquire an imaginative existence largely independent of the original. The resulting work does not simply quote its predecessor or arrange fragments from it. It occupies the predecessor’s formal and rhetorical architecture, making that structure available for transformations whose direction cannot be entirely anticipated. Such an account is especially useful for understanding her rewritings of George Herbert, her occupation of familiar television and theatrical situations, and her use of inherited poetic forms. Yet the hermit-crab analogy is also instructively imperfect. The animal may occupy its shell without materially transforming it, whereas Gordon frequently subjects the borrowed structure to such radical deformation that the distinction between habitation and reconstruction becomes difficult to sustain. More importantly, the analogy raises the question of what constitutes a poetic shell in the first place: an arrangement of lines, a recognizable literary genre, an ideological proposition, a social situation, or the accumulated expectations through which a reader recognizes a particular kind of utterance? Gordon’s work repeatedly suggests that these structures are inseparable, that to inhabit an inherited form is also to enter the historical and social relations it carries. Her originality resides not in an imagined emancipation from influence but in the exceptionally inventive ways she inhabits forms that are never entirely her own.

This relationship between inheritance and transformation is already evident in “jordan iv,” an early rewriting of Herbert’s “Jordan” poems, where Gordon takes up the devotional poet’s suspicion of rhetorical ornament and converts it into an unstable meditation on the pleasures of verbal elaboration. The speaker remembers an enthusiasm for language that threatens to overwhelm the ideas it is supposed to communicate:

My thoughts got top-heavy, covered with curlicues,
Decking the sense, as if it were to sell.

The lines acknowledge the familiar objection that elaborate poetic diction may become an impediment to sincerity, but the acknowledgment is itself conspicuously embellished. “Curlicues” is at once the name of an ornamental excess and a delightfully curling verbal object, its sounds performing the decorative movement it ostensibly condemns. The image of thoughts becoming “top-heavy” gives a physical instability to an intellectual predicament, as though the weight of verbal decoration might cause the conceptual structure beneath it to topple. Yet the poem’s relation to Herbert is more complicated than a simple defense of artificiality against devotional plainness. By inhabiting the earlier poem’s argumentative structure, Gordon makes its supposedly corrective appeal to sincerity appear equally dependent upon literary convention. The desire to express love directly remains real, but the language through which such directness is recommended is itself inherited, stylized, and historically situated. The conflict is therefore not between an authentic feeling and the artificial language that distorts it, but among competing rhetorical procedures, each of which offers particular possibilities and limitations for emotional expression. Gordon’s speaker is embarrassed by her own appetite for ornament without becoming willing to relinquish it, a predicament that recurs throughout her work and provides one of the principal sources of its comedy.

A more extensive example occurs in “Gorgeous,” from V. Imp, a poem whose fourteen-page expanse is constructed largely from brief, asterisk-separated units, many of them resembling drastically compressed haiku or tanka. Its relationship to Japanese short-form poetry is especially suggestive when considered through the example of Terayama Shūji, whose experimental tanka sequences introduced surrealist displacement, eroticism, popular culture, and theatrical artificiality into forms frequently associated with lyric concentration. Gordon’s Japanese affinities are not confined to literary technique: her work repeatedly draws upon Japanese language, popular imagery, performance, and the stylized pleasures of what might be called Japanoiserie, a category that necessarily involves questions of cultural mediation and imaginative fabrication as well as direct experience. In “Gorgeous,” however, the influence is most consequential at the level of formal organization. The individual units possess a degree of autonomy, each offering a miniature field of perception or verbal transformation, while their accumulation produces an extended, discontinuous performance of consciousness. The poem’s three divisions, designated “Fits,” also recall the episodic structure of Carroll’s The Hunting of the Snark, introducing a further association between literary composition, involuntary disturbance, and theatrical nonsense. Gordon’s miniature forms are thus continually unsettled by the larger structures in which they participate. Their brevity concentrates attention upon the smallest syntactic and phonetic decisions, while their arrangement in an extended sequence prevents any single moment from achieving the closure or self-sufficiency that the miniature might appear to promise.

Consider a three-line unit from the opening Fit:

otter games and
more distantly
the water (wonder) horse

The apparent simplicity of the first line is already unstable, since “games” attributes a recognizable category of human activity to the animals under observation. The second line introduces a movement of spatial recession whose object remains uncertain until the final phrase arrives, where the “water (wonder) horse” transforms the apparently natural scene into a linguistic and imaginative event. The parenthesis is crucial because it neither replaces “water” with “wonder” nor allows the two terms to become entirely separate. Instead, the reader is made to experience their simultaneous presence, the second word emerging within the first through a slight alteration of its material form. The transition from animal observation to mythical possibility is therefore inseparable from a visible operation upon language. The unit possesses something of the charged juxtaposition associated with Japanese short-form poetry, but its effects also recall Coolidge’s willingness to allow the phonetic and morphological properties of words to generate unexpected compositional movement. Gordon’s procedure is not reducible to either antecedent. The miniature’s concentrated architecture intensifies the improvisatory transformation, while the transformation itself prevents the unit from becoming a stable image of the natural world. Something similar occurs in the astonishingly compressed “purely zinnia: delusion,” where the colon, conventionally an instrument of definition or explanation, introduces a relation whose terms resist any obvious paraphrase. The specific flower is confronted with an abstraction that seems to diagnose or explain it, yet the apparent equivalence is neither logical nor merely arbitrary. The punctuation performs the gesture of clarification while refusing its expected result, producing a miniature instance of the disciplined irrationality that characterizes Carroll’s nonsense. Gordon’s work frequently proceeds through such displacements of rhetorical convention, allowing the recognizable forms of explanation, argument, or description to produce consequences that disturb the authority those forms ordinarily claim.

The comic intelligence of “Gorgeous” becomes especially apparent in another miniature:

granite taken for styrofoam
out of the doldrums
and into—pardon me—puissance

The initial confusion between granite and Styrofoam establishes a tactile and conceptual reversal between heaviness and lightness, durability and disposability, while the second line begins an idiomatic movement whose conclusion appears to promise some conventional form of renewed vitality. Instead, the poem arrives at the magnificently inflated “puissance,” but only after a tiny interruption in which the speaker appears to apologize for the extravagance of her own diction. This “pardon me” constitutes a theatrical event whose scale is inversely proportional to its implications. The speaker, having prepared the conditions for her own rhetorical elevation, momentarily steps outside the performance in order to acknowledge its possible absurdity; yet the acknowledgment is itself part of the performance, functioning simultaneously as apology, comic delay, provocation, and an advertisement for the very verbal excess it purports to excuse. One might hear in this gesture an inheritance from Jewish comic performance, particularly the self-interrupting monologue in which the speaker anticipates the audience’s suspicion of grandiosity and converts that suspicion into an additional source of authority. But the moment also exemplifies a more general Gordonian procedure in which the poem incorporates its own skeptical reader, refusing to allow the literary utterance to preserve an uncontested dignity. The word puissance does not simply announce power; it acquires its peculiar force through the staged embarrassment of its arrival, as though linguistic authority could be exercised only by first exposing its pretensions. Gordon does not renounce the grand word. She enjoys it, but makes its enjoyment inseparable from the comedy of having chosen it. The resulting utterance is neither a straightforward assertion of poetic mastery nor an act of self-effacement. It is an agonistic performance in which literary ambition and the ridicule of literary ambition become mutually sustaining activities.

Such self-interruption has affinities with traditions of Jewish theatrical and verbal comedy that extend from Yiddish popular performance through American vaudeville, early Hollywood, and the comedy of the Marx Brothers and Mel Brooks. Gordon’s own engagement with Molly Picon, whom she once discussed in a presentation at the Workmen’s Circle, makes the connection more than a purely abstract historical parallel, although its significance should not be reduced to a claim of direct stylistic descent. What matters is the availability of a comic repertoire in which the performer cultivates intimacy with the audience through self-deprecation, anticipates hostile judgment, and punctures the dignity of her own declarations without necessarily surrendering their force. Such practices also circulate through familial speech, where argument, affectionate mockery, exaggerated complaint, and the theatrical presentation of one’s own inadequacies may become habitual ways of negotiating intimacy and authority. Gordon’s poetry transforms these conversational procedures into formal devices: parenthetical interruptions, sudden changes of register, direct addresses, apologies, confessions, and deliberate failures of rhetorical elevation. The historical tensions within Yiddish theatre between popular entertainment dismissed as shund and the aspirations of more respectable dramatic art offer a further, particularly suggestive analogy for Gordon’s quarrel with the institutions of poetic seriousness. Her writing repeatedly asks why certain kinds of verbal display should be regarded as intellectually legitimate while others, especially those associated with feminine ornament, vulgar pleasure, comic excess, or theatrical exhibitionism, are relegated to a supposedly inferior aesthetic order. Yet her challenge to these hierarchies is complicated by her own desire for recognition. She does not inhabit the comfortable position of an artist who has transcended the need for literary prestige. Her speakers frequently want the very distinctions they ridicule, and their self-deprecation becomes more consequential because it does not free them from vanity, competitiveness, or disappointment.

The importance of this comic self-implication becomes unmistakable in “Genius Grant: A Hateful Sestina,” from Emotional Support Peacock, where the institutional vocabulary of literary ambition is subjected to the repetitive machinery of an inherited poetic form. Grants, fellowships, residencies, workshops, and the tenure track become the recurrent terms through which the sestina organizes its aggression, while Gordon’s phonetic transformations disclose the absurdity latent in the language of professional recognition. The movement from “tenure” toward “tenor,” “tin ear,” and “manure” does not merely produce a series of jokes; it reveals the instability of the institutional distinctions that these words are ordinarily employed to secure. The poem’s formal constraint becomes an analogue for the repetitive social structures through which literary success is imagined and pursued. Yet the speaker’s antagonism is persistently compromised by her own participation in those structures. The wish for distinction survives the exposure of distinction’s absurdity. This is one of the reasons Gordon’s relation to mainstream or supposedly serious poetry cannot be adequately described as simple opposition. Her work is engaged in a continuing struggle with the aesthetic and institutional conditions of literary value, a struggle that also extends into the experimental traditions to which she belongs. Language poetry, conceptual writing, Flarf, and the New York School may provide alternative methods and forms of legitimacy, but none remains exempt from Gordon’s skeptical intelligence. The comic agon takes place within the avant-garde as well as against the literary mainstream, and its energy derives partly from the poet’s refusal to imagine that any particular aesthetic affiliation can resolve the contradictions of artistic ambition.

If this aspect of Gordon’s work emphasizes its argumentative and theatrical character, “Poetry Is Junk,” from Vile Lilt, provides a more expansive account of the relationship between ornament, embodiment, and subjectivity. The poem begins with an epigraph from Adolf Loos’s “Ornament and Crime,” placing its elaborate decorative vocabulary within a history of modernist suspicion toward ornament as culturally regressive or aesthetically superfluous. Yet Gordon’s response does not simply reverse the hierarchy by declaring ornament superior to the unadorned. Instead, the poem constructs an extraordinarily elaborate verbal environment in which fashion, femininity, erotic activity, bodily secretion, and theories of authorship become inseparable. The opening instructions concerning the animation of costume suggest that personality is not an autonomous interior substance subsequently expressed through external appearance, but something constituted through the successful inhabitation of a socially available form. Gordon’s speaker becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish from the fabrics, ornaments, and bodily materials with which she surrounds herself, and the supposed boundary between decorative surface and authentic self begins to dissolve. The poem’s argument is thus performed through its own compositional procedures, which incorporate inherited statements, fragments of other people’s language, and shifts among incompatible registers. Its dense ornamental texture is not a covering concealing an otherwise transparent proposition; it is the means through which the proposition becomes available.

The most explicit formulation of this conception of authorship occurs in the deceptively simple declaration:

Expression irrigates expression.

The verb “irrigates” transforms literary influence into a material and ecological process, suggesting the movement of nourishment across boundaries rather than a succession of discrete intellectual inheritances. Gordon develops the idea through quotations from contemporary writers, including Rob Fitterman and Drew Gardner, whose observations concerning impersonal subjectivity and collective handwriting become part of the poem’s own argument. Their incorporation is not merely illustrative. It enacts the claim that individual expression is constituted through the circulation of language among speakers. A few lines later Gordon asks, “Who’s containable?” and answers, “I’m all apertures,” a formulation more precise than the familiar avant-garde celebration of uncontainability. An aperture is not simply an absence of boundaries but an opening within a structure, a point through which light, air, sound, or bodily material may pass. The speaker is therefore imagined not as an emancipated self overflowing its limits but as a system of exchanges, simultaneously constituted and transformed by what enters it. This conception has evident affinities with Language writing’s interrogation of the autonomous lyric subject, but Gordon’s formulation introduces an insistently erotic and affective dimension. Her collective self is not impersonal in the sense of being emotionally evacuated. It is porous because it desires, absorbs, responds, and becomes entangled with the language and sensations of others.

The presence of Mina Loy within “Poetry Is Junk” is especially significant in this respect. Gordon incorporates Loy’s formulation of love as an expansion of self-sympathy, allowing the modernist predecessor’s account of erotic and ethical identification to become part of an argument about the affective possibilities of appropriation. The borrowed phrase becomes meaningful not because it is detached from its prior context but because it is made available for renewed inhabitation. Gordon’s practice thus complicates any easy opposition between conceptual impersonality and lyric intimacy. The language of others enters the poem through a desire for connection that is itself inseparable from the pleasure of verbal transformation. This is also why the poem’s sustained attention to lace-making matters. Lace provides a material analogue for the relation between inherited language and individual invention, a pattern produced through the intertwining of threads whose significance depends upon both connection and open space. Its labor is repetitive, intricate, and technically demanding, yet its products have often been relegated to the supposedly secondary domain of feminine decoration. Gordon’s verbal lacework challenges that hierarchy by making ornamental construction a mode of intellectual activity, while refusing to purify ornament of its associations with erotic display, commodity culture, and the social regulation of femininity. Decoration is neither innocent nor merely oppressive. It is a field of contradictory pleasures and constraints through which the self may become visible, vulnerable, and imaginatively transformed.

The question of beauty becomes especially difficult here, because Gordon’s work repeatedly produces experiences of genuine lyric beauty through materials that seem designed to resist conventional aesthetic idealization. The relevant comparison is perhaps André Breton’s notion of beauté convulsive, a beauty arising through the sudden disruption of familiar relations and the encounter with forms that unsettle the boundaries between the marvelous and the ordinary. Yet Gordon’s beauty is not simply surrealist convulsion transferred into the field of contemporary experimental poetry. It is frequently convulsed by laughter, embarrassed by its own aspirations, and contaminated by bodily materials that conventional lyric beauty has historically sought to exclude. The grotesque is not merely the dark underside of a more elevated aesthetic; it becomes part of the experience of beauty itself. In Gordon, a flower may resemble an organ, an anatomical feature may become a decorative flourish, and the awkward physicality of an animal may acquire an almost unbearable tenderness. Her poetry does not consistently ask the reader to look past ugliness in order to discover beauty beneath it. Instead, it makes the categories interfere with one another, allowing the sensuous intensity of an image to persist even when its constituent materials appear ridiculous, vulgar, or repellent. The possibility of such beauty is inseparable from the poet’s reluctance to accept established conventions governing what may legitimately be admired.

This problem is beautifully dramatized in “Mauvais Song,” from Emotional Support Peacock, where Gordon looks back upon an earlier experience of linguistic abundance with a mixture of longing, skepticism, and loss. The poem begins by recalling a world that seemed saturated with movement and sensation:

Once everything was magnolian*,
It shimmied and fumed, was shot through
With motion, with vascular fibers of gleaming.

The invented adjective “magnolian” transforms the flower into a condition of existence, suggesting not merely that the world resembled a magnolia but that its very atmosphere had acquired the flower’s sensuous properties. Yet the following verbs, “shimmied” and “fumed,” introduce bodily movement and chemical instability into the floral image, while “vascular fibers of gleaming” makes luminosity seem anatomically organized. The beauty is neither serene nor stable. It is animated by processes that threaten to exceed the forms through which they become perceptible. The poem’s subsequent recollection of opening books and experiencing a rush of linguistic elation suggests that reading once offered an almost intoxicating access to such transformations, an experience now compromised by distraction, technological mediation, and the awareness of historical and personal diminishment. The speaker’s longing is not simply for youth or for a lost cultural moment, but for a mode of receptivity through which language seemed capable of renewing the world’s perceptual intensity.

Yet “Mauvais Song” does not settle into elegy. Its associative movements continually interrupt the possibility of a sustained lament, introducing comic self-reproach, phonetic play, abrupt changes of scale, and bodily grotesquerie. The speaker’s consciousness becomes something buttery, fragrant, and excessive, while the poem’s rhythms deliberately resist the smoothness of conventional lyric consolation. Its beauty is inseparable from its awkwardness. The desire for the world to become newly radiant persists, but it can no longer be expressed without acknowledging the failures and distractions that compromise the speaker’s attention. The poem is moving partly because it refuses to purify its longing of absurdity. The lyric impulse survives, but it does so in a damaged, self-conscious, and extravagantly artificial form.

A related tension governs “Dismay,” from Scented Rushes, whose compressed account of romantic jealousy moves among erotic longing, resentment, and self-ridicule. The poem’s speaker imagines imitating a rival in order to enter the beloved’s emotional world, but the fantasy collapses into a painfully ordinary recognition:

I can’t
get her haircut: I don’t
have that kind of hair.

The bathos is exquisite. An elaborate drama of erotic displacement and imagined identification encounters the stubborn material fact of a hairstyle. Yet the joke does not cancel the emotional injury. Indeed, it makes the injury more exact by locating it within the body’s particular limitations. The speaker cannot become the rival because her body will not permit the necessary transformation, and the absurdity of the obstacle intensifies rather than diminishes the experience of exclusion. The poem’s concluding movement returns to the humiliations of unreciprocated attachment, exposing the speaker’s bitterness without granting her the consolations of moral superiority. Here Gordon’s self-deprecation is inseparable from a lyric tenderness that the poem repeatedly attempts to undermine. Its beauty resides partly in the refusal to make emotional pain more dignified than it actually is.

The relationship between beauty and the grotesque becomes especially expansive in “Coney Island Avenue,” where Gordon’s attention moves through the heterogeneous commercial, linguistic, and cultural environment of Brooklyn. The poem’s abundant catalogues of businesses, religious institutions, foods, advertisements, clothing, and overheard language produce a crowded verbal landscape in which the social world appears simultaneously exhilarating and oppressive. Its descriptions refuse the distance of ethnographic observation, continually allowing the speaker’s desires, associations, and sensory responses to intervene in the apparent documentation of place. The resulting poem has something of the flâneur’s appetite for urban spectacle, but its movements are more bodily and less detached, implicated in the very systems of consumption, migration, and cultural exchange it describes. Its accumulation of names and objects becomes a form of ecstatic attention, though one continually threatened by the violence and absurdity of the historical world.

Near the poem’s conclusion, this verbal proliferation suddenly yields to a remarkable concentration:

And then the paralyzing rush of emotion:

The phrase announces an experience whose intensity seems to arrest the poem’s previous movement. What follows is an image of grace entering faces through a condition of dissonant gaiety. The effect is extraordinary partly because the poem has refused to prepare for it through the conventional procedures of lyric elevation. No purified landscape has been established, no exemplary figure selected as the vehicle of transcendence, no stable opposition constructed between the degraded world and an idealized realm beyond it. Instead, the experience of grace emerges from the crowded, contradictory, commercially saturated environment the poem has been inhabiting all along. The apparent disorder of the preceding catalogue becomes retrospectively inseparable from the possibility of revelation. Yet the emotion remains “paralyzing,” a term that suggests disturbance as much as fulfillment. The beauty does not resolve the dissonance. It occurs through it.

This is perhaps the point at which Breton’s convulsive beauty becomes most illuminating, provided that the comparison is allowed to remain difficult. Gordon’s poems repeatedly discover beauty through discontinuity, unexpected juxtaposition, erotic disturbance, and transformations of scale, but the experience is seldom unaccompanied by comedy. Their convulsions may be those of laughter as readily as desire or terror, and the apparent dignity of lyric revelation is continually at risk of being interrupted by the arrival of something ridiculous. Yet such interruptions need not diminish the revelation. They may prevent it from becoming formulaic, preserving the experience of beauty as something irreducible to an established aesthetic category. Gordon’s poems are often most beautiful when they are most reluctant to announce themselves as beautiful, when their verbal extravagance unexpectedly produces an emotional or perceptual intensity that neither the speaker nor the reader can fully assimilate.

The theatrical works develop this unstable relation between beauty, comedy, and violence in explicitly social terms. In at home with the Petries, Gordon inhabits the familiar domestic environment of The Dick Van Dyke Show, preserving the recognizability of its characters and conversational conventions while transforming the household into a grotesque economy of bodily consumption. Rob’s request for breakfast eggs becomes a demand for Laura’s reproductive organs, while the family’s repeated expressions of hunger progressively expose the apparently limitless claims made upon the maternal body. The play’s comedy depends upon the sitcom’s ability to accommodate increasingly monstrous demands without abandoning its reassuring domestic idiom. Yet the work is not simply a parody of patriarchal family arrangements. Laura’s reflections upon childbirth introduce a moment of genuine wonder into the surrounding grotesquerie, acknowledging the extraordinary fact of having produced another human being even as the play develops toward the literal consumption of her body. The tenderness and the horror are not neatly separable. They arise from the same experience of maternal embodiment, whose possibilities for affection and vulnerability are inseparable from the demands it invites.

Laura’s final resurrection and declaration of the play’s ending exemplify Gordon’s persistent use of fourth-wall-breaking as a means of disturbing the authority of inherited forms. The woman who has been consumed within the domestic fiction reclaims the ability to terminate the performance itself, an assertion of theatrical agency that does not simply undo the violence but changes the terms through which it can be represented. A similar procedure governs Beatles Ex-Wives Reunion, where a genteel social gathering becomes the occasion for increasingly unstable and aggressive discourse about gender, celebrity, and heterosexual attachment. Gordon’s practice of reversing quotations and reassigning ideological language makes familiar arguments difficult to locate within their customary positions. The resulting comedy exposes the contradictions of the cultural scripts through which the women have been defined, while the final destruction of their teacups literalizes the violence contained within the rituals of feminine politeness. In both works, the borrowed theatrical structure becomes the occasion for a critique that cannot be separated from the pleasures of performance. The comedy does not merely reveal an underlying seriousness; it constitutes one of the principal means through which that seriousness becomes available.

The agonistic relation between Gordon’s work and the institutions of poetry receives its most sustained examination in “Sturm,” the concluding long poem of Emotional Support Peacock. Beginning with an invitation to contribute to a project commemorating Hurricane Sandy, accompanied by an offer of payment, the poem immediately discloses the speaker’s excitement about earning money and her uncertainty about representing a catastrophe from which she personally suffered little. Its opening violates the expected decorum of the occasion by exposing motivations that a more conventionally serious poem might conceal. The resulting comedy is also an ethical intervention, since the speaker refuses to present herself as a transparent vehicle for collective suffering when her actual circumstances are considerably more compromised. The poem subsequently considers and abandons a succession of compositional approaches, including rewriting Ginsberg’s Howl, producing a visual poem in the form of a cyclone, and assembling documentary materials. Each possibility encounters an objection, sometimes practical, sometimes aesthetic, sometimes ethical. The work becomes an account of its own inability to discover an adequate form, a failure that generates the poem rather than preventing its existence.

At one point Gordon offers a devastatingly compressed inventory of available poetic procedures, dismissing Flarf as overly clever, conceptualism as insufficiently affective, documentary poetry as excessively earnest, and Language poetry as belated. The judgments are impatient, reductive, and deliberately funny, but their force derives from the fact that they implicate traditions central to Gordon’s own practice. The speaker cannot achieve a stable critical position by rejecting the methods she has inherited, since her poem continues to depend upon their possibilities. Its subsequent movement through spirals, galaxies, cinematic imagery, Japanese manga, and increasingly extravagant verbal transformations makes this contradiction formally productive. The poem begins to imitate the centrifugal activity it describes, circling among competing aesthetic possibilities without arriving at a definitive resolution. Its engagement with M. NourbeSe Philip’s Zong! further complicates the question of beauty by confronting the extraordinary formal inventiveness of a work concerned with historical atrocity. Gordon recognizes that linguistic fracture may be essential to the representation of experiences that resist ordinary comprehension, while remaining suspicious of any aesthetic procedure that would convert suffering too easily into literary prestige.

The poem’s revision of a statement by Seamus Heaney concerning poetry’s responsibility to disclose truth provides a particularly clear example of Gordon’s hermit-crab procedure. She enters the rhetorical structure of an inherited proposition and reverses its values, imagining poetry as a means of becoming more artificial, compromised, and fragmented rather than more authentic and whole. The gesture is comic, but its implications are substantial. Gordon refuses the assumption that poetry’s ethical legitimacy must depend upon its capacity to produce a purified subject or a transparent account of experience. Yet the refusal does not establish an alternative doctrine of aesthetic irresponsibility. “Sturm” remains troubled by the actual suffering caused by the hurricane and by the speaker’s distance from that suffering. Its ethical seriousness lies partly in the persistence of that difficulty, in the unwillingness to resolve it through a reassuring declaration of artistic principle. The poem’s eventual acknowledgment that the various forms of poetry may derive their value from their very wrongness offers no comfortable solution. Rather, it suggests that artistic practice may be most consequential when it remains conscious of the inadequacies of its own procedures.

Gordon’s later work repeatedly returns to the question of what poetry might still provide under conditions of aesthetic exhaustion, political disillusionment, and diminished confidence in inherited literary forms. “What do I want from a poem anymore?” imagines the poem as an object that might hang, dangle, or become a toy, then revises the apparent rejection of poetry into a desire to unite the toy and the poem. The revision is crucial, since the artificiality of the toy does not prevent it from becoming an object of genuine emotional investment. Gordon’s subsequent acknowledgment of her affection for fictional television characters extends the argument beyond literary form, suggesting that the distinction between the real and the fabricated cannot adequately account for the emotional consequences of art. The toy, the diorama, and the hermit crab thus become related figures for a poetics in which imaginative life takes place through the occupation and animation of constructed structures. They also complicate any attempt to characterize Gordon’s writing through a generalized celebration of uncontainability. Her work is deeply invested in containers, costumes, miniature environments, poetic forms, and inherited rhetorical architectures. Its extraordinary verbal abundance frequently arises through the resistance these structures offer.

What ultimately distinguishes Gordon’s poetry is not simply its willingness to incorporate materials excluded from conventional lyric decorum, but its insistence that the relations among beauty, ugliness, sincerity, artifice, intellectual ambition, and emotional vulnerability remain unresolved. The comic performer who apologizes for her own grandiosity does not thereby cease to desire magnificence; the poet who exposes the compromised motivations of literary production does not abandon the wish to make something beautiful; the writer who insists upon the collective nature of language continues to produce a voice of extraordinary singularity. These contradictions are not weaknesses awaiting theoretical correction. They are among the principal conditions of the work’s imaginative vitality. Gordon’s poetry is most consequential when it refuses to permit any one of its impulses to establish unquestioned authority over the others.

The formulation “I’m all apertures” is therefore less a declaration of unrestricted freedom than an acknowledgment of constitutive exposure. The poet is open to other voices, inherited forms, bodily sensations, cultural fantasies, and the irreducible disorder of social life, but that openness is not without cost. It makes possible both imaginative invention and emotional injury, both lyric beauty and the grotesque distortions through which such beauty becomes perceptible. Gordon’s poems frequently seek an intensity of experience that conventional aesthetic categories cannot accommodate, but they also remain suspicious of the rhetoric through which intensity is elevated into artistic virtue. Their beauty is sometimes convulsive, sometimes tender, sometimes ridiculous, and often difficult to distinguish from the disturbances that threaten it. Rather than purifying the lyric of those disturbances, Gordon allows them to enter its very constitution, discovering within the awkward, the ornamental, the embarrassing, and the excessive possibilities of feeling that a more disciplined art might have excluded.

The unresolved question is whether the singularity of Gordon’s poetic voice can be understood apart from its insistence upon the collective, borrowed, and endlessly transformable character of language. Her poems suggest that it cannot. Their unmistakable temperament emerges through an extraordinary receptivity to materials that belong to no single speaker, while their most intimate moments remain inseparable from the conventions, quotations, jokes, and inherited structures through which experience becomes articulate. Such a poetics does not restore the sovereign lyric subject after the critiques of Language writing, nor does it accept the evacuation of affect as the necessary consequence of those critiques. It discovers, rather, that the very instability of individual expression may provide the conditions for a more complicated emotional and aesthetic life. Gordon’s poems remain crowded with other people’s language, yet they are never merely impersonal; they are intensely artificial, yet they repeatedly produce genuine feeling; they are ridiculous, yet their ridicule does not exhaust the seriousness of what they disclose. The peculiar beauty of this work arises within those contradictions, where the language of the world, in all its vulgarity and magnificence, becomes something at once recognizably inherited and unexpectedly strange.


About the author

Mira K. Vell is an independent scholar specializing in experimental poetics, literary nonsense, and the aesthetics of excess. She is the author of The Unbecoming of Sense: Ornament, Error, and the Lyric Grotesque (2014) and A Theory of Too Much: Excess, Embarrassment, and the Comic Sublime (2021). Her current project, Kvell and Trembling: Toward a Minor Theory of Enthusiasm, has been repeatedly delayed by the proliferation of its footnotes.

Editorial note: Mira K. Vell is a fictional scholarly persona. This essay was developed through an extended critical dialogue between Nada Gordon and ChatGPT.

The Pounethical Wager

The robot wrote this, not me.

THE POUNETHICAL WAGER

Toward a Theory of Irresponsible Seriousness

A Brief Monograph

Preface: Against the Tyranny of Consequence

In The Poethical Wager, Joan Retallack proposes a poetics enlarged by ethical responsibility, a practice of making that recognizes its implication in the world. The addition of the h to poetics marks a commitment to the difficult work of living among others, embracing contingency, and producing forms adequate to the complexities of experience.

University of California Press

The present monograph proposes a modest but consequential subtraction: the removal of responsibility as poetry’s necessary justification and the substitution of the pun as the fundamental unit of poetic ethics.

We call this pounethics.

Where poethics asks what poetry can do for the world, pounethics asks what happens when the world is obliged to endure poetry.

The distinction is not trivial.

Neither is it entirely serious.

This is our wager.

I. The Pun as Epistemological Catastrophe

The pun is traditionally regarded as the lowest form of wit, a judgment that mistakes altitude for significance.

Indeed, the pun occupies a peculiarly disreputable position in the hierarchy of literary devices. It is tolerated in Shakespeare, deplored in conversation, and frequently punished by groaning. Yet this very disreputability constitutes its philosophical importance.

The pun exposes the scandal that language means more than it means to.

Consider the word sole.

It designates the bottom of a foot, a fish, and, when sounded, a soul. The proximity of these meanings does not necessarily disclose any profound metaphysical relationship between fish, feet, and the immaterial essence of human beings. Rather, it discloses the absurdity of supposing that meaning must always be justified by profundity.

A fish is not a soul.

Yet a fish can be a sole.

And a sole can be lost.

The pounethical thinker refuses to resolve this difficulty.

More importantly, the pounethical thinker refuses to pretend that it is a difficulty.

II. Against the Ethical Imperative

Contemporary experimental poetics has frequently been called upon to account for its political, social, and ethical implications. The poet is asked to acknowledge complicity, practice attentiveness, embrace alterity, resist dominant structures, and cultivate modes of responsible engagement.

These are admirable activities.

They are also exhausting.

Pounethics proposes that the burden of moral seriousness has become so thoroughly attached to poetic experimentation that the poem risks being transformed into an exceptionally elaborate declaration of good intentions.

The pounethical poem declines this assignment.

It need not improve the reader.

It need not model a desirable form of social interaction.

It need not even be particularly good.

Indeed, the bad pun, in its glorious indifference to approval, may offer a more radical model of poetic freedom than the most scrupulously constructed ethical statement.

The bad pun knows that it is bad and proceeds anyway.

It is, in this respect, a model of courage.

III. The Swerve and the Swivel

Retallack’s poethical wager draws upon the Epicurean swerve, that unpredictable departure from predetermined trajectories through which contingency enters the universe.

Pounethics replaces the swerve with the swivel.

The distinction is essential.

The swerve alters a trajectory.

The swivel remains more or less in place while changing its orientation.

A swivel chair is therefore the exemplary pounethical apparatus.

Seated in such a chair, the poet may confront the world, turn away from it, confront it again, and eventually become dizzy.

No progress is guaranteed.

No revolutionary transformation is necessarily achieved.

Nevertheless, something has turned.

This is sufficient.

The swivel also describes the movement of the pun, which does not escape language but rotates within it, revealing an entirely different semantic landscape without traveling anywhere.

The pounethical poet is thus a traveler who never leaves the premises.

IV. The Ethics of the Groan

The groan is the characteristic reception of the pun.

Unlike laughter, which may signify pleasure, surprise, superiority, or nervousness, the groan registers the listener’s simultaneous comprehension and refusal.

The groaner understands the pun perfectly.

This is precisely the problem.

A successful pun produces an involuntary recognition of a connection the listener would prefer not to acknowledge. Its force lies in compelling participation without securing consent to enjoyment.

The ethical dimensions of this event are not entirely comfortable.

Nevertheless, the groan establishes a form of social intimacy unavailable to the solemn pronouncement. One cannot groan at a pun without having participated, however reluctantly, in its production of meaning.

The pounethical community is therefore constituted not through agreement but through shared exasperation.

Its members are united by the recognition that something terrible has happened to language and that everyone is implicated.

V. On the Right to Be Ridiculous

One of the central assumptions of the poethical project is that aesthetic practice participates in the construction of forms of life.

Pounethics accepts this proposition while rejecting the implication that the forms of life so constructed must be ethically exemplary.

Ridiculousness is also a form of life.

Indeed, the ridiculous may possess a peculiar value in a culture that demands that every activity demonstrate its seriousness, utility, productivity, or moral legitimacy.

The pun refuses such accounting.

It wastes time.

It diverts attention.

It makes an already complicated world unnecessarily more complicated.

It gives us two things where one would have sufficed.

In doing so, it challenges the economy of significance itself.

Why must the poet produce significance when language is already producing a surplus of it?

Why must every surprise become an occasion for ethical improvement?

Why not allow the surprise to remain a surprise, or to deteriorate into a joke?

The pounethical wager is that the permission to be ridiculous may itself be a necessary condition of intellectual and imaginative freedom.

Not every deviation needs to become a destination.

Some are simply detours.

Others are de-tours.

And some, admittedly, should never have been attempted.

VI. Toward a Pounethical Practice

The pounethical practitioner must cultivate a particular disposition toward language.

She must be willing to mistake one word for another, to follow a resemblance beyond the limits of plausibility, to entertain propositions that have no business appearing together, and to relinquish the comforting assumption that linguistic accidents conceal important truths.

For pounethics is not a hermeneutics of hidden meaning.

The pun does not uncover a secret buried beneath the surface of language.

It produces a temporary collision on that surface.

Meaning is not excavated.

It is sideswiped.

A pounethical practice therefore encourages a disciplined irresponsibility toward interpretation. One must attend closely to language while remaining cheerfully indifferent to whether the resulting observations deserve to exist.

This indifference should not be confused with carelessness.

To construct a genuinely atrocious pun requires considerable sensitivity to phonology, syntax, semantic expectation, and the psychological vulnerabilities of one’s audience.

Badness, properly cultivated, is an achievement.

VII. The Wager

What, finally, is at stake?

Retallack’s wager locates possibility in the encounter between experimental form and the uncertainties of ethical life.

The pounethical wager proposes a different possibility: that poetry might matter most when it declines to matter in the ways we have been taught to expect.

Its wager is not that the pun will save us.

It will not.

Nor is it that linguistic play constitutes an adequate response to injustice, suffering, ecological catastrophe, or the other emergencies of contemporary existence.

It does not.

The wager is rather that no such adequacy need be established before play can begin.

There is no shortage of seriousness in the world. There may, however, be a shortage of permissible unseriousness.

Pounethics seeks to restore the right to squander language, to pursue gratuitous correspondences, to arrive at conclusions that turn out to be beginnings, and to construct elaborate intellectual edifices upon foundations of breathtaking silliness.

Its fundamental proposition is that the ethical value of art cannot be exhausted by its ethical intentions.

Nor, for that matter, by its ethical value.

Some things may simply be funny.

Some may not be funny at all, although their authors persist in believing otherwise.

Both possibilities must be preserved.

Coda: A Pounethical Manifesto

We refuse the proposition that every poem must justify its existence by improving the conditions of existence.

We refuse to believe that seriousness is the necessary evidence of thought.

We refuse the compulsory conversion of linguistic pleasure into moral instruction.

We affirm the typo, the malapropism, the spoonerism, the double entendre, the misunderstood instruction, and the splendidly misdirected inference.

We insist upon the importance of the unimportant.

We welcome the groan.

We wager that language, left to its own devices, will continue to produce possibilities beyond the intentions of its users.

And where Retallack asks us to recognize the ethical stakes of the poetic act, we ask whether the stakes themselves might not occasionally be mistaken for steaks.

If so, they should be served.

Preferably rare.

For the pounethical wager is, in the last analysis, not a question of what we stand to gain.

It is a question of what we can afford to pun.

Fin. Or perhaps finned.

Interview with Cole Heinowitz, 2001

I

Cole with her dear friend Shiba at Naropa in 1994, on the occasion of my first meeting with her.

I conducted this interview with the late, beloved Cole Heinowitz while she was doing research in Seville in 2001. I had moved to Brooklyn a couple of years earlier, and this interview was intended for Gary Sullivan’s magazine ReadMe. I don’t think it was ever published. I tried to keep my questions simple and anodyne, because I genuinely wanted to know things like her research topic and her genesis and evolution as a writer, but as you will see her trickster brilliance came into play as she made literary works out of her responses. I don’t remember why we stopped the interview when we did, but the date makes me think it was because some buildings were destroyed.

Nada:  What, for you, is the value or use  of a filtered vocabulary – an ‘armature’? And  in what way is it the outward posture of your internal disposition? How would you describe that disposition?

Could you say more about the pact you make with the reader? That is, if you were to put that pact into the form of a direct address, how would it sound?  Do you have an ideal reader and if so what are her/his characteristics? What sort of pass would you want that ideal reader to make at your writing?

Describe this urge towards exhibition or confession and how it is made manifest – or encrypted – in your work. What do you think are its motivations?

Cole:  I want to get to know the posture of “disclosure to a fault” from the inside in order to expand my emotional repertoire, since even though I sometimes tend to harbor key information in the service of self-protection, I also realize that my attitude is based on a certain lack of belief in the world’s capacities. I have decided to make honesty my temporary new polestar, to see how it goes. If you read it right, this decision says more about what life’s like in Andalucia than I could possibly provide via the gory details of sex and climatology, even were I the world’s most accomplished exhibitionist. As for the risk of my getting too comfortable and slackening the ropes that bind and sustain, not a chance! An organicist honesty as I can best understand it, could only possibly lead to greater and more important discomforts, which I feed on.  

Yours in skyrocketing gravity, Cole

Nada:  What are you researching in Andalucia?

Cole: In September of 2000, I took myself to the deep south of Spain (Seville, the site where the empire originally launched itself across the Atlantic) under the pretense of conducting dissertation research. My dissertation examines how British and French sentimental literature of the late eighteenth century helped construct the liberal subjectivity we all know (and hate) so well nowadays by borrowing from and perverting Spanish accounts of contact with the “noble savages” of the New World. I’m here studying those original documents (such as the _Cartas relatorias_ of Columbus and Cortés, the _Comentarios reales_ of “el Inca” Garcilaso de la Vega,  and the _Brevísima relación de la destruición de las Indias_ by Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas) which the French and British laid hands on in the 1700s. These documents helped fuel the Black Legend of Spanish barbarity toward the peaceful natives which was in turn used to justify the usurpation of power from the flailing Spanish empire in the name of humanity. But the English and the French not only styled themselves the liberators of the poor Indian, in their writings, they posited an a priori identification with Indian civilizations which depicted their commercial takeover as a return to an idealized pre-Columbian state, even going so far as to whiten the color of the Indian’s skin and to modify his social rituals in order to render him more amenable to a European readership.   

The late eighteenth century was both the era of Sensibility and of the transformation of the European economy from one based on the possession of land to one based on the possession of markets. My dissertation argues that these two events are fundamentally intertwined, not just historically but ideologically. Sensibility was understood as the nexus of “hidden mechanisms which governed the lives of men,”(1) the understanding and control of which were necessary for the successful operations of the modern state. The idea of the native made possible by increased trans-Atlantic contact helped to develop this notion of the sensible self. Conversely, the global implications of sensibility seemed to hang in the balance of the emerging market imperialism insofar as the latter enterprise was understood either as the violation or the protection of the native man’s natural state. At stake in both the debates over Sensibility and the renovated commercial economics was the relationship between private interest and the larger society: Was the individual essentially amenable to society? Was free trade consistent with the greater good of the state? If not, what changes could be made to bring the two terms into harmony?   

With the increasing dissolution of the Spanish colonial empire in South America and the opening of that market to other European influences in the eighteenth century, it became necessary for Britain and France to articulate their difference from their imperial predecessor. Diverging from Las Casas’ pedagogical father-child model of colonial relations, which boded the eventual transfer of power to the “child,” British and French writers found more sensible  ways of defining their identity in terms of Spanish America, ranging from Helen Maria Williams’ copenetration of sentiments in which the moral axis of identification outstrips the axis of historical facts (see her romantic epic, _Peru_), to the seemingly enlightened conjugal model whose “promise of ‘eternal love’ stabilizes and veils the actual power relationship among the conjugal partners in Marmontel’s _Les Incas_.”(2) In addition to conducting research, going to classes, and giving lectures, then, I spend a good deal of time reflecting on questions such as: Do these European writings “other” the Latin American or represent him as compatible with—or even part of—the domestic subject? To what extent do these writings define the domestic subject as coterminous with the modern nation, its economy, and its foreign policy? What accounts for these writers’ decision to erase the dominant criollo class of American-born Spaniards from their accounts of contemporary South America and to replace him with a glorified “noble savage,” who was not the American group with whom the contemporary Briton and Frenchman shared cultural contact and commercial interests? Why does the writing of Sensibility borrow from colonial historiography only to reject the traditional definition of colonialism? And finally, what does it mean for post-colonial scholarship that eighteenth-century Europeans rethought their identity by reference to South America, with which their dominant relationship was not colonial but rather one of liberal commerce?

1 Pagden, Anthony, _The Uncertainties of Empire:

Essays in Iberian and Ibero-American Intellectual

History_, Hampshire: Valorium, 1994, p. 4.

2 Zantop, Susan, “Domesticating the Other: European

Colonial Fantasies 1770-1830” in _Encountering the

Other(s):Studies in literature, history, and culture_,

ed. Brinker-Gabler, Gisela, Albany : State University

of New York Press, 1995, p. 279.

Nada:  Reading the description of your project made me aware of some cultural images so entrenched in me I should have known to be suspicious of them.  One is a sense of old Spain as dark, cruel, and sinister, and of Spaniards as forceful purveyors of ideology, clad in black with high ruffs and severe expressions, full of strategy and often tortuous machinations to increase their power.  Little did I know that this notion may well be based on propaganda from French  and English sources scrambling to justify their own power grabs! 

What I would most like to know is, what drew you to isolate this particular research project out of the welter of possible research projects? I sense that there is some relevant autobiography…

Cole:  As to what my life is like here, apart from the dissertation business:

(Background: In the United States, I was worsting ancestral shapnel droppings into bundles, but now I have begun the work of converting these bundles into thongs and bumper stickers. Radio station employees trail the vehicles bearing my bumper stickers in order to give the drivers cash rewards for their patronage; the backs of the drivers’ heads are sweating and cropped in the latitudinal heat. The drivers arrive at the rummage sale where rococo smudge sticks are renegotiated as multi-flavored welfare and the chagrin at the end of life’s noble journey is bartered for a meaningful six-pack. Sarcasm molts, yielding reams of scaly personalities for the natives who, at the end of the sale, are all too predictably melted down for their metal content.)  

“The parish acrobats” is perhaps a term too dignified for those going out on the Sevillian street in hopes of finding a glance to substantiate their flaccid antechamber. I am perceived as the opposite of wandering inchoate desires, overvalued, based on a standard of scarcity, and seen to exhume significance from places believed empty. Since there are no other experimental (I use the term with malaise, you know) writers here, they always ask me what I find out there in the uninspiring fray, and when I come back with hands dripping with fresh fish guts and a few hook wounds I vindicate their cultural baggage but still can’t step up to the plate as a valued member because baseball, like big business, only exists here as a negative value. The buying lifestyle of the Sevillano is engineered according to the belief that appearance connotes a known social sphere that can be enjoyed in absentia if one is properly adorned. Valorations of quality lift off from social service, or what the Catholics calls “acts,” and transplant into space, in this way forming a regime, though “mentality” as a term is still surrounded by the half-visible, half-attainable (vislumbrado) halo of education. As you can imagine, laundry occupies a large part of my time.  

Immersion in another language directs itself first to the loss of native grammar and sentence order. The words stay with you, excepting an acute blow to the visual cortex and the subsequent loss of all recognizable tenacity. The grammar storage unit keeps the social relations, and is the area most compromised by rhythmic alteration in the manifestation of human character. Vocabulary measures raw intelligence and grammar measures relational intelligence. The people in the living room are not paying any attention to me, and I have been writing this for some time now. But then again, they are not only Andalucians, but scientists,  and therefore doubly distinguished by the amount of time they can spend concentrating exclusively on one thing. Eschewing awkwardness credit profiling, they expect that if I don’t want to be on their sofa while they get high I will leave, and they will probably like me more for this.   

A bus driver smokes a cigarette in “three,” which means ten, minutes between shifts and no one can fuck with his right to public self assertion. This is the punchline, or cusp, of my rhythmic divergence from this environment: the pointed digression followed by the oblique hit. But trade winds brings us together, and ween me into criolism. There are beaches in Huelva where the literal washes the tone back up. In the American Atlantic,  by contrast, decisions smuggle overwhelming tonal concerns into the literal. So the half of my investigations here are into the physical prompts to my renegade tonality. I like to use the phrase “During the age of triumph” as a stance toward my friends, but I have to admit that there is a great generosity in Saint Augustine (who was probably explicating Cervantes) when he says, “but those things which have no significance of their own are interwoven for the sake of things which are significant.” Before such a damned knack for style, even my Judaism pales.  

“El que se pica, ajos come”—If you got stung, you must have been eating garlic. If something I said hurt you (since I had no intention of doing so) it must reflect something harsh you think about yourself and which I accidentally triggered. Certitude of the national character of which one partakes  at the broad moment of communication can be a serious handicap, though the cultureless envy it. Since I believe this, I have to concede a latter day-cosmopolitan, as opposed to a nationalist or regionalist, vision of expressive functionality. This ideology weds me uncomfortably to the “enlightened” imperialism which stingily imparts liberal humanism to the powerful alone. At Carnavál, which takes place in Cadiz next week  I will either go dressed as a joint stock company or the British Navy.  

Nada: Tell me about your genesis and evolution as a writer.

Civilization chain gangs triangulate the mountain summit. I am between the abyss and the mountain, on the road. The ambient gentleman is not believable right from the start. 

I confirmed this theory with the puffy night nurse as well as the pharmacist: Under very demanding circumstances, inferior genes, those with less concentration  on the inside of the cell wall, are ejected by influx from the outside, and left to fend for themselves in the formative body. Once free of their cell, these genes can jump to any other formative body bearing a quorum of characteristics similar to those of the original host body.

This knowledge is useful as a substitute for psychic powers or belief in God when forming a community.

The more advanced/decadent of the inferior genes, however,  can jump across bodies using absolutely any line of similitude, from matching sleep cycles to a matching second grade year of broken fibia. My mother is explaining to me how awareness of this intricate matrix renders the fashion focus obsolete, and hence, as I see it then, writing. I accuse her, to no avail, of being a prostelytizer for the lowest common denominator, and yet I win the argument solely because I am a hybrid of inferior and noble genetic material, and this confers, if nothing else, demonstrative power. This winning line: “How did I know then, so well as if it were my very own memory, that you had stolen my diary and hid it away, using it piecemeal to fish in the creek, floating scraps to my sister now and then to raise her IQ score? 

I developed a fetish for being disappointed. Sadly, I require a mortal object to penetrate with desire. If it grows, I keep it around and try to shut up long enough for it to get used to the house. Luckily, the offering of food is a petition for solidarity, whether I like it or not, and I am jewish girl. So the soundtrack can’t overwhelm the action. 

A tip for screenwriters: It’s ony 25 percent what you say and the rest is your ability to sustain the mood. For those in emotion, the phenomenon of time passing passes final sentence on what’s considered content. Then, at around 15 years old, I started hearing talk of “pluralism in measure.” That’s when I entered my local university and mounted a campaign against the foreign exchange students of the world, who were only alive to add quantity in the absence of quality to the normative youth experience. The campaign was called: “Anticipatory wish-fufillement of the entitled,” with the fine-print call to arms: “New information is being used to cover up the fact that the old information hasn’t been studied properly yet!” Now that I am older, however, I recognize that this operation is a structural business tool (1), to wit, a homing device used in the obstacle training course the executives who will ultimately advance to put into practice the studies on the old information.

I knew a person in the United States who was always in love or—. The Spaniards have one thing up on the Americans: Failure doesn’t cause them to protect themselves. As such, certainly nothing so whimsical as the fear of failure can shut them up. Whereas, the American says: “Everyone I’ve ever dated has made me a better writer. And for that reason, every relationship I’ve ever had has ended.” At the age of 26, I am learning the former tactic by appreciating the dangerous spar coming from inside the opening it has caused.  I teach a Spanish person that “cloak and dagger” means “irony” amidst our glancing blows and doggerels of telos. Downside-effect: a loss of appreciation for the arts of protection and self-deployment. Other potential side effects ( applicable to the 0.1% of those surveyed who have always read a tale of worldly doom in the pheonetic progress of vowels): Upon seeing an accent mark, a feeling arises that something potentially revelatory has been omitted from the document.

Okay. I knew a person in the United States who was always in love or capable, oh I don’t—, maybe I was 24. I called it a high-risk value-system. I couldn’t bear to think about that risk, even though I seemed the type of person who was always thinking about it. So I attracted those risk-taking ones. But now the risk comes knocking for me, calling itself familiarity. I did miss it, now that I know what it was. (See what I mean about time passing through the education?) (“:Hello.”) (They spar.)

My life is devoted to the service of making human intercourse more demanding, with a reward system at the end as I see fit; in short, to revamping of the ruined theater. Theatricality is in a shamefully degraded state, serving more to divert and obscure than to clarify and broaden, a pathetically muddy run-off of _Discipline and Punish_. This was perhaps inevitable given theatricality’s foundation upon the intersection of complacent lying and vigorous, nearly sociopathic, hope (2). But I am not interested in the dialectic between degradation and ambition. I only believe that rescuing drama for the nourishment of logic is the surest prenatal footing. In the noblest incarnation of theatricality, when it becomes real, you realize that you don’t have to believe in things for them to be true.  Drama is that function that occurs while navegating distance. I incriminate the dramatists not for their falsity but for their insecurity, being the predator that lives in the distance. Symbolism is born of their sense of iniquity. I only help their argot along by feeling guilty for hating them and pretending not to avoid them.

Nonetheless, until recently, I couldn’t work at high levels without something I called faith in people. I don’t remember exactly how people came to occupy this prize position, perhaps it’s just what happens to most women of above-average intelligence: they learn to infallibly legitimize their limitations. Then, further down the road, they are allowed to learn to find one person who exceeds those limitations, and (don’t think I’m happy about this) they call this “falling in love.” Then, just beyond that, they learn to objectify capacity and so not to leave their emotions to chance or hormones, which, like the NASDAQ, dictate faith quotients daily. 

You need to get on a road that exceeds good taste in order to pass through perfection (3). Learn to recognize that spot beforehand and get off there. If this isn’t possible, say hello to David Bowie for me. ——–  1) In addition to being a tool of applied business, the study abroad principle is a functional element in hermits, who, in general possess both extreme self-awareness and sufficient independent means to exempt them from convincing, bartering, or the rest of the public desperation sideshow (which, incidentally, ends in joy). House-builders: don’t choose this deck.  2) “Genealogy of theatrical decay,” a soft pass: 

  1. The association of belief with creation, and 
  2. The intravenous supplantion of self-help with creative standards. Tips for the dramatist: Becoming a successful person should have nothing to do, in the first trimester, with identifying greatness. Give belief back to those aspiring to the world to come. Don’t believe in yourself. Read yourself and learn to base all subsequent actions on the interpretation of your findings.  

3) The cultivation of information excess and the creation of ambiguity therefrom is not a potential road, but rather, the corrosion of roads, a sabotage technique used by nearly-urbanized hostiles. 

********

How to Write a Book of Poems in the Style of Nada Gordon: A Playful Guide to Language, Whimsy, and the Everyday

Introduction: The Spirit of Nada Gordon’s Poetry

Nada Gordon’s poetry blends humor, whimsy, and an irreverent approach to language with a keen sense of the mundane and the surreal. To write a book of poems in her style, you’ll need to embrace playful experimentation, cultural references, and the ability to make the ordinary feel extraordinary. Gordon’s work is often tied to Flarf, a movement known for its collage-like use of found language, online searches, and randomness, creating unexpected juxtapositions. This guide will walk you through key strategies for channeling her approach.

Chapter 1: Embrace Playfulness and Humor

One of the hallmarks of Nada Gordon’s poetry is her ability to infuse humor into serious subjects. She often turns to the absurd to break down the formal constraints of poetry and language. Here’s how to cultivate that spirit of play:

Step 1: Forget Seriousness (for Now)

  • Let go of formality: Writing like Nada Gordon requires you to play with words, mix high and low registers, and create unexpected shifts in tone.
  • Use wordplay and puns: Experiment with multiple meanings, and don’t be afraid to indulge in puns, jokes, and playful deconstructions of clichés.

Exercise:

Pick a mundane object, like a toaster or a pair of socks. Write a poem that anthropomorphizes the object in a humorous way, letting it “speak” about its existence or feelings. Push the absurdity of the situation, turning it into a small narrative or riff on modern life.

Chapter 2: Experiment with Found Language

Nada Gordon is well-known for incorporating found text from the internet, advertisements, song lyrics, and overheard conversations. Flarf poetry uses this technique to create poems that feel chaotic, but oddly unified.

Step 2: Collect and Remix Language

  • Collect from everywhere: Browse online forums, social media, or random Google searches. Copy snippets of text that catch your eye. These might be quirky, banal, or even nonsensical.
  • Mix genres: Blend together scientific jargon, pop culture references, and advertising slogans in one poem. Don’t worry if the resulting lines don’t make sense on the surface.

Exercise:

Do a random Google search for an unusual phrase, like “purple rain on a Sunday morning.” Copy the first five sentences from different sources that appear in your search results. Now, write a poem using those fragments as the backbone. Feel free to add your own lines and manipulate the text to create new meanings.

Chapter 3: Find the Beauty in Everyday Life

Gordon often blurs the line between the profound and the trivial, transforming everyday moments into points of reflection or unexpected insight. You don’t need grand themes to write in her style; the ordinary is often enough.

Step 3: Focus on the Mundane, Elevate the Ordinary

  • Observe everyday scenes: Pay attention to what’s around you—whether it’s your morning commute, a conversation at the grocery store, or scrolling through social media.
  • Make the mundane magical: Take these ordinary details and use poetic language to transform them. Allow your subject to bend and warp as it moves between reality and the surreal.

Exercise:

Spend a few minutes observing your surroundings, whether indoors or outside. Jot down notes about small, insignificant things—what people are wearing, the sound of traffic, snippets of conversations. Write a poem that transforms these observations into something surreal or dreamlike. Give objects emotions, let inanimate things speak.

Chapter 4: Incorporate Pop Culture and Internet Slang

Nada Gordon’s work often includes cultural references, memes, and internet language. To write like her, embrace the fleeting and evolving language of the web, popular songs, or TV shows.

Step 4: Speak the Language of Now

  • Use slang and internet phrases: Gordon often pulls from the language of the present moment, incorporating hashtags, slang, and internet culture into her poetry.
  • Subvert the reference: Use a pop culture reference or meme in a way that adds layers of meaning or shifts the context.

Exercise:

Think of a trending phrase or internet meme (for example, “YOLO” or “I’m just here for the snacks”). Write a poem that includes this phrase but twists its meaning—turning a joke or casual statement into something poignant or reflective.

Chapter 5: Juxtapose High and Low Culture

In Nada Gordon’s work, high and low culture often sit side by side, creating a layered effect. Classical references might collide with pop music lyrics, or philosophical musings could be interrupted by slang or everyday language.

Step 5: Mix Worlds, Break Hierarchies

  • Blend references: Use literary or philosophical references alongside more casual or contemporary language. Let the tension between these elements create an unexpected resonance.
  • Don’t resolve the clash: Part of the charm of Nada Gordon’s style is the unresolved tension between high and low. Allow your poem to feel fragmented or disjointed rather than seeking resolution.

Exercise:

Write a poem that references both something “high” (e.g., Greek mythology, Shakespeare, or classical music) and something “low” (e.g., reality TV, fast food, or viral TikTok trends). Don’t worry about making these elements fit together seamlessly—let them exist in an awkward, playful relationship.

Chapter 6: Embrace Fluidity and Non-Linear Narrative

Nada Gordon’s poems often defy traditional narrative structures. Instead of telling a straightforward story, they weave between ideas, images, and voices in a fluid, almost dreamlike manner.

Step 6: Break Free from Linear Storytelling

  • Let your mind wander: Don’t be afraid to jump between ideas or images without clear transitions. Trust the reader to follow along, even if the logic is strange or fragmented.
  • Use collage-like structure: Think of your poem as a collage of different voices, images, and snippets of language that come together to create a larger impression.

Exercise:

Write a poem that jumps between at least three different ideas or scenes. For instance, start with a reflection on your breakfast, then shift to a memory from your childhood, and finally, end with a random internet search. Allow these elements to remain distinct, yet part of the same piece.

Chapter 7: Avoid Overly Personal “I” Statements

Nada Gordon’s work doesn’t dwell heavily on the personal, introspective “I” in the way that some confessional poets might. Instead, her speaker is often playful, detached, or even ironic, avoiding direct emotional expression.

Step 7: Distance Yourself from the Speaker

  • Avoid direct confessions: Steer clear of overly personal or sentimental expressions. If you want to express emotion, do so through indirection, humor, or surrealism.
  • Let the world speak: Focus on external observations, dialogue, or fragmented images rather than personal introspection.

Exercise:

Write a poem where the speaker is not a central, confessional “I.” Instead, have objects, animals, or other characters speak. Let the “I” exist as a distant observer, if at all.


Conclusion: Finding Your Voice Through Gordon’s Playfulness

Writing a book of poems in the style of Nada Gordon requires an embrace of the whimsical, the fragmented, and the playful. By blending found language, cultural references, humor, and surreal twists on the everyday, you can create poems that feel lively and unexpected. Remember, Nada Gordon’s style thrives on breaking rules, so feel free to experiment, improvise, and let your poems surprise both you and your readers.